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Author(s): Colin M. Turbayne

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KANT'S REFUTATION OF DOGMATIC IDEALISM

I

It is commonly held that because of his obvious misinterpretations of Berkeley's philosophy, which he called dogmatic or visionary and mystical idealism, Kant thereby betrayed a gross misunderstanding of that philosopher. The theory advanced to explain this is that Kant was not acquainted with any of Berkeley's writings, but obtained his knowledge from inadequate second-hand sources.¹ This theory is supported by the fact that Kant's knowledge of the English language was most imperfect. He never read a single English book. Coupled with this is the apparently acceptable fact that there were no German translations of Berkeley's works in existence before 1781, the year of publication of the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.² In that year, there appeared a German translation of Berkeley's *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*.³ This work was therefore available to Kant before he published his *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics* (1783)⁴ and the second edition of the *Critique* (1787). But such is the nature of Kant's account of Berkeley's doctrine in these works that, on the common view, Kant neglected to avail himself of the opportunity to read it. Thus, previous assessments of the evidence, internal and external, have produced the view that Kant knew nothing of Berkeley's writings at first hand and, accordingly, misunderstood and misinterpreted his teaching. From this, it follows, although the commentators have omitted to stress this conclusion, that Kant's many attempted refutations of dogmatic idealism fail before they begin. The above is not only the accepted view, backed by seemingly strong evidence; it is the most plausible. Nevertheless, it is almost wholly mistaken, as I shall show.

II

First, let us banish the idea that Kant could not have read any of Berkeley's writings before he published the first edition of the *Critique*. On the contrary, he could have read at least two. These are Berkeley's *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* and his *De Motu*. Professor Kemp Smith indicates that a German translation of the *Three Dialogues* was published

¹See N. Kemp Smith, *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 156-7. Cf. also A. C. Ewing, *A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 182; H. J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, II, p. 376; T. D. Weldon, *Introduction to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 9-10; A. D. Lindsay, *Kant*, p. 15; *et. al.*

²References to the first and second editions will be by page numbers and the letters A and B respectively.

³Hereafter referred to in notes by dialogue number as *Hylas*. Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge* will be referred to in notes by paragraph numbers as *Prin.*

⁴Hereafter referred to in notes by section numbers as *Proleg.*

at Leipzig in 1781, and asserts that this was the first of Berkeley's writings to appear in German.⁵ Authorities on Kant have ignored a much earlier translation of the same work which was published at Rostock in 1756. Their oversight is understandable because the translation lies hidden in a larger work entitled *Die Wirklichkeit der Körper*⁶ which contains also Arthur Collier's *Clavis Universalis*. Hence, the *Three Dialogues*, which contains the whole of Berkeley's main doctrine, was available to Kant long before he began to compose his *Critique*. Moreover, the fact that the editor and translator of the *Dialogues*, Johann Christian Eschenbach I, was also a professor of philosophy at Rostock, who sought to refute Berkeley's doctrine and who subsequently published works of his own on logic and metaphysics,⁷ increases the chances that the book attracted Kant's attention. Laying aside, for the time being, all the claims adduced from the internal evidence to the effect that Kant was wholly unacquainted with Berkeley's writings, it seems to me highly unlikely that Kant, who lived with the book-dealer Kanter for a considerable time prior to the eighties,⁸ and who was sufficiently curious to buy and study Swedenborg's *Arcana Coelestia*,⁹ should not have availed himself of the opportunity to examine a book containing the official doctrines of two other exponents of 'mystical and visionary idealism',¹⁰ and indeed, as the title indicates, the most eminent repudiators of the reality of the entire corporeal world.

Another important work of Berkeley's which Kant might also have read, is the former's *De Motu*, published in London in 1721 and again in 1752. This Latin treatise did not have a wide circulation on the continent. However, it opposes the doctrines of Newton and Leibniz on the subject of motion in space, a subject which was Kant's special concern in his pre-

⁵*Op. cit.*, p. 156.

⁶I have examined a copy of this work from the library of the University of Southern California. Its full title is: *Samlung der vornehmsten Schriftsteller die die Wirklichkeit ihres eignen Körpers und der ganzen Körperwelt läugnen. Enthaltend des Berkeleys Gespräche zwischen Hylas und Philonous und des Colliers Allgemeinen Schlüssel. Uebersetzt und mit wiederlegenden Anmerkungen versehen nebst einem Anhang worin die Wirklichkeit der Körper erwiesen wird von Joh. Christ. Eschenbach, Prof. Philos. zu Rostock.* (Rostock bey Unton Ferdinand Röse. 1756.) Eschenbach states in the Preface that since it was impossible to come upon the English original his translation of the *Dialogues* is based on the French translation of Amsterdam, 1750. T. E. Jessop, *Bibliography of George Berkeley*, no. 73, gives the same title. However, in Kayser, *Bücher-Lexicon* (now *Bücherverzeichnis*), V (S-T), Leipzig, 1835, pp. 34b-35a, an abbreviated title of undoubtedly the same book is given. It omits reference to Berkeley's and Collier's works, also the phrase *und der ganzen Körperwelt*, and names the publisher as Cnobloch of Leipzig.

⁷*Metaphysik, oder Hauptwissenschaft* (1757); *Elementa Logices* (1766); both written at Rostock and published at Leipzig by Cnobloch.

⁸See F. Paulsen, *Immanuel Kant*, Scribners (1902), p. 45.

⁹Kant's work on Swedenborg, *The Dreams of a Visioneer*, appeared in 1766. Kant was, of course, extremely sceptical of Swedenborg's theories. However, the Russian philosopher, Vladimir Sergeivitch Soloviev, in his article on Kant (Broekhaus and Ephron's encyclopaedic dictionary) attributes Kant's renunciation of Newton's absolute space and his corresponding adoption of the ideality of space in his *Dissertation* (1770) to the influence of Swedenborg. See A. V. Vasiliev, *Space, Time, Motion* (1924), pp. 74-5.

¹⁰Kant uses this phrase to describe Berkeley's position in *Proleg.* 13. Kemp Smith notes that such a description is doubtless partly due to the old-time association of idealism in Kant's mind with Swedenborg's teaching. *Op. cit.*, p. 158, note 4.

Critical period. To a diligent enquirer, Berkeley's *De Motu*, which, as far as Kant was concerned, required no translation, would most assuredly have been accessible.

Having removed the supposed impossibility of Kant's direct acquaintance with Berkeley's works prior to the publication of the first edition of the *Critique*, by showing that at least two of them were available to Kant, and one of these readily so, let us now proceed to examine Kant's attempted refutations of idealism.

III

There are eight separate passages in the first and second editions of the *Critique* and in the *Prolegomena* which are specific attempts by Kant to refute idealism. These passages, approximately in the order in which they were written, and accompanied by brief comments upon the kinds of idealism Kant opposes, are as follows :

FIRST EDITION OF *CRITIQUE*

- I *Section 7 of the Transcendental Aesthetic* (A36-41).
Explicit against 'idealism'.
- II *The Fourth Paralogism : Of Ideality* (A366-80).
Explicit against all 'empirical' idealism, and, in particular, against the 'sceptical' idealism of Descartes. 'Dogmatic' idealism is merely mentioned.
- III *Section 6 of the Antinomy of Pure Reason* (A491-97).
Explicit against 'empirical' idealism.

THE *PROLEGOMENA*

- IV *Section 13, Remarks II and III*.
Explicit against the 'mystical and visionary' idealism of Berkeley. The 'empirical' or 'dreaming' idealism of Descartes is mentioned.
- V *Section 49*.
Explicit against 'material, or Cartesian' idealism.
- VI *Appendix, Second Part*.
Explicit against all 'genuine' idealism from the Eleatics, through Plato, to Berkeley, and particularly against the 'dogmatic' idealism of Berkeley. The 'sceptical' idealism of Descartes is mentioned.

SECOND EDITION OF *CRITIQUE*

- VII *Section 8, Parts III and IV of the Transcendental Aesthetic* (B69-72).
Explicit against Berkeley.
- VIII *Refutation of Idealism* (B274-9) supplemented by *note to Preface* (Bxxxix-xli).
Explicit against the 'problematic' idealism of Descartes. The 'dogmatic' idealism of Berkeley is described. Both are called instances of 'material' idealism.

The idealism which Kant seeks to refute is material or empirical idealism, that is, any doctrine which doubts or denies the existence of objects in space outside us. The former is called 'sceptical' or, though not until the last passage, 'problematic' idealism. Descartes' name is the only one explicitly associated with it. The latter is the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley. It is only once described as 'mystical and visionary'. From the above, Kant distinguishes his own critical or transcendental idealism, a doctrine which denies the *absolute* reality of space and time and the external bodies in them. It involves empirical realism or dualism, according to which, bodies in space outside us, as well as ourselves who perceive them, are considered to be empirically real. In the first edition of the *Critique*, the most important passage is the fourth *Paralogism* which, by adopting a position resembling Berkeley's, tries to refute Descartes. Although Kant promises to deal with dogmatic idealism, Berkeley is neither named nor opposed in this edition. The first edition of the *Critique* appeared in the early summer of 1781. Kant waited many anxious months for the response of the learned world. He was most disappointed by the contents of the first, the Garve-Feder or Göttingen review, which appeared in January, 1782. Garve described the *Critique* as 'a system of higher idealism', and classified Kant with Berkeley. This was anathema to Kant. Accordingly, in the *Prolegomena* (published Easter, 1783), Kant, for the first time, is at pains to show that his position is the 'very contrary' of Berkeley's. Two of the three 'refutations' in the *Prolegomena* are directed against Berkeley. Kant asserts that Berkeley's doctrine is 'an objectionable idealism', against which and other such 'chimeras of the brain', his *Critique* contains the 'proper antidote'. In the second edition of the *Critique* (1787), Kant suppresses what Schopenhauer called 'the principal idealistic passage', i.e., the fourth *Paralogism*, and replaces it by the *Refutation of Idealism* which answers Descartes' view without appearing to fall into subjectivism. The other passage, added to the *Aesthetic*, is, as we have seen, directed against Berkeley. In these passages, occur those well-known obvious misinterpretations of Berkeley. To 'the good Berkeley' is ascribed the view that the things in space are 'merely imaginary entities' or that he degrades bodies in space to 'mere illusion'.

It appears from the above summary that the eight 'refutations' of idealism are directed against either Descartes or Berkeley. This, however, is mere appearance. If one ponders on these passages in the order in which they were written, one may discern an underlying central argument to which the attacks on Descartes and Berkeley are merely incidental. This central argument begins by outlining a position common to most previous metaphysicians and natural philosophers. It is, in fact, the prime feature of the Newtonian World-View. Kant calls it 'transcendental realism'. Omitting details, the argument continues by showing that such a view leads inevitably to idealism, and culminates by turning the argument of idealism against itself to provide a positive proof of the external world. This is the

real argument of the 'refutations'. Depending on the point of emphasis, it has been regarded either as a refutation of realism or (as Kant treats it) as a refutation of idealism with its corresponding proof of the external world which exhibits his empirical realism. Although the argument is discernible in all the 'refutations' except the last, it is most clearly seen in the fourth *Paralogism*. In the last 'refutation', Kant uses a method of proof of the external world different from that of the preceding seven. Because only one of these passages was subsequently suppressed by Kant, the central argument must be considered official Kantian doctrine. In this paper I shall, accordingly, ignore the *Refutation of Idealism* except in so far as it presents Kant's views on Berkeley.

It is my view that the central argument of the 'refutations' has a systematic similarity, in its principal features, with the main argument of Berkeley's *Principles* and *Dialogues*. Berkeley is concerned to expose the fallacies inherent in a certain way of thinking to which the metaphysicians and physicists of his age were prone. He calls this doctrine 'materialism' and those who teach it, 'materialists', or, more often, 'the philosophers'. He shows that it leads inevitably to scepticism, and, in fact, joins the sceptics for much of the way. Then he turns the argument of scepticism against itself to provide (up to his time) a unique proof of the external world. Since Berkeley's death, commentators have tended to emphasize the first half of his argument, which they have seen as an attempt to refute materialism or realism, and have been notorious in their neglect of the last. Consequently, Berkeley has been presented to the world as an idealist. Few have dwelt upon his refutation of scepticism and his corresponding proof of the external world which exhibits his empirical realism. The whole argument appears most clearly in that paradigm of dramatic unity, the *Three Dialogues*. It is seen, of course, in the *Principles*, but here the dissentient side of immaterialism is so protested at the expense of Berkeley's empirical realism that one can readily understand the mistaken judgement of history.

IV

In order to prove my point, I shall now present, in more detail, the main steps of this argument. I shall juxtapose the key assertions of Kant and Berkeley. For reasons only of conciseness, quotations from the *Principles* will preponderate over those from the *Dialogues* :

First Step

The philosophers assert the absolute reality of space and time, and hold that external objects exist by themselves independently of our senses.

Kant : [The transcendental realists] . . . maintain the absolute reality of space and time, whether as subsistent or only as inherent (A39) . . . wrongly supposing that objects of the senses, if they are to be external, must have an existence by themselves, and independently of the senses (A369).

Berkeley : [The philosophers assert] the being of an absolute space, distinct from that which is perceived by sense (*Prin.* 116). (They hold) that there are certain objects really existing without the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from being perceived (*Prin.* 56).

Kant specifically refers to certain 'mathematical' and 'metaphysical' students of nature; probably Newton and Leibniz. Berkeley elsewhere refers to 'absolute space, that phantom of the mechanic and geometrical philosophers' (*Siris* 271). However, in the above passages, he has in mind, not only Newton, but Locke, Descartes, Malebranche, More and Raphson. The views of these thinkers and many others (whom I shall continue to refer to as 'the philosophers') make them advocates of the prevailing doctrine, called by Kant, 'realism' and by Berkeley, 'materialism'. Berkeley only barely considers the subject of time, but doubtless intends to ascribe to his opponents the belief in absolute time, which notion he calls 'duration in abstract' (*Prin.* 97).

Kant and Berkeley observe that the transcendental realist or materialist distinguishes between the primary and the secondary qualities of bodies. The former, such as extension and shape, really inhere in external bodies. The latter, such as heat, colour and taste, belong only to appearances and are held to have no proper existence 'outside us' (in the transcendental sense) but to be entirely relative to our sensibility (*Proleg.* 13, A373; *Prin.* 9).¹¹

Second Step

This doctrine of the philosophers makes them victims of the common delusion that the human mind can venture beyond all possible experience.

Kant: [Transcendental realism involves] the transcendental illusion, by which metaphysics has hitherto been deceived and led to the childish endeavour of catching at bubbles, because appearances, which are mere ideas,¹² were taken for things in themselves (*Proleg.* 13. Cf. A369, 491).

Berkeley: When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of it self, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind; though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in it self (*Prin.* 23).

Kant and Berkeley provide similar analyses of the error committed by the philosophers; it is manifested in the deluded attempt to venture beyond the limits of possible experience. Dealing directly with this symptom, Kant observes that 'our knowledge of the existence of things reaches only so far as perception' (A226), and that, 'in the absence of perception even imagining and dreaming are not possible' (A377). Berkeley notices the same truth, 'My conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception' (*Prin.* 5), and again, 'Many things, for aught I know, may exist . . . but then those things must be possible' (*Hylas* III). Kant names the error, 'the transcendental illusion', here defined as treating ideas as things in themselves. This instance of the illusion he calls, on one occasion, 'dreaming idealism' (*Proleg.* 13). On

¹¹This observation by Kant and Berkeley oversimplifies Locke's official position. For him, the secondary qualities are not in us, but are powers of the primary qualities which produce *ideas* of secondary qualities in our minds.

¹²Throughout this paper, following Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, I translate the term *Vorstellung* by 'idea'. This is more appropriate than the 'representation' of most translations because Kant is referring to the same entities as Locke, Berkeley and the Cartesians, who use the term 'idea' or '*idée*'.

Berkeley's analysis also, our supposed conception of external bodies (material substance) in absolute space outside us¹³ is shown to be nothing but a contemplation of our own ideas. The error of the philosophers is therefore revealed as interpreting these ideas as external bodies. Yet for him, the analysis goes further. In the quoted passage, he describes the source of the error as 'the mind taking no notice of itself'. We forget that we are chained to a human sensibility. We forget ourselves as observers.¹⁴

Third Step

The philosophers' distinction of things from ideas leads inevitably to scepticism.

Kant : Transcendental realism inevitably falls into difficulties, and finds itself obliged to give way to empirical idealism, in that it regards the objects of outer sense as something distinct from the senses themselves (A 371). [On this view] it is quite impossible to understand how we could arrive at a knowledge of their reality outside us, since we have to rely merely on the idea which is in us (A378. Cf. *Proleg.* 49).

Berkeley : All this scepticism follows from our supposing a difference between *things* and *ideas*. . . . So long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking things, distinct from their being perceived, it is not only impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real unthinking being, but even that it exists. . . . We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things (*Prin.* 87-8).

As we have seen, Kant is opposed to empirical or material idealism. Its two sub-divisions are sceptical idealism (that which doubts) and dogmatic idealism (that which denies) the existence of bodies in space outside us. The meaning Kant intends to give to 'idealism' is partially obscured by his various definitions and by the ambiguity of the phrase 'bodies in space outside us'. Is Kant referring to material substance or to sensible things in empirical space? A careful reading of all the 'refutations' indicates that Kant intends the latter. We shall see that Kant's own official doctrine, transcendental idealism, denies the absolute reality of bodies in absolute space. Moreover, Kant's use of the title 'empirical' reveals the nature of the idealism he opposes. Finally, although on one occasion Kant defines 'dogmatic idealist' as 'one who denies the existence of matter', and 'sceptical idealist' as 'one who doubts its existence' (A377), in the same passage he defines 'matter' as 'only a species of ideas' (A370). From all this it is evident that the idealism Kant opposes is the doctrine which doubts or denies the reality of the sensible world. Since once transcendental realism is upheld, sceptical idealism is 'inevitable' (A371) and dogmatic idealism 'unavoidable' (B274), it follows that Kant regards these doctrines as two different stages in the logical decline of transcendental realism.

On my view, in spite of a different terminology, the same two stages can be distinguished in Berkeley's analysis of the logical decline of materialism. This is true of the *Dialogues*, not of the *Principles* in which only one stage

¹³'Your belief in matter', Philonous remarks to Hylas, 'makes you *dream* of those unknown natures in everything' (*Hylas* III).

¹⁴Berkeley discovered this *Idol of the Tribe* whilst working on a particular problem in the psychology of vision, viz., the problem of the inverted retinal image, in which he exposes the same delusion in the writers of optics, including Newton and Molyneux. (See his *New Theory of Vision*, 116-118.)

is discernible. Hylas vacillates between doubt and denial of the reality of the external world. The former position, Berkeley calls 'scepticism'. However, when Hylas is 'plunged yet deeper in uncertainty' and is forced, 'positively to deny the real existence of any part of the universe', Berkeley names this further stage, 'the deepest and most deplorable scepticism' (*Hylas* III). Thus, that position which Kant calls 'sceptical idealism', Berkeley calls 'scepticism', and what Kant calls 'dogmatic idealism', Berkeley calls 'the deepest scepticism'. It is the latter position of extreme scepticism that both men are most anxious to ridicule and escape from. The one thinks of it as a chimera of the brain, the other, as an extravagancy.

In similar fashion, Kant and Berkeley expose the consequences of the philosophers' corresponding distinctions between two spaces and two times—absolute and relative. Kant observes that absolute space and time, 'two eternal and infinite self-subsistent non-entities (*Undinge*) . . . must be the necessary condition of the existence of all things, and moreover must continue to exist, even although all existing things be removed. . . . As conditions of all existence in general, they must also be the conditions of the existence of God' (A39, B71). Since the existence of all things thus depends on nothing, the whole universe is thereby 'transformed into mere *illusion*' (B70). This consequence would belong to a doctrine lying beyond even extreme scepticism or dogmatic idealism since our own selves would also vanish from existence. All such notions, Kant calls 'absurdities' (B70). Berkeley's account is similar. As we have seen, he barely considers time. He ascribes to the philosophers the view that 'absolute space continues to exist after the annihilation of all bodies'. He remarks that it 'necessarily exists of its own nature' (*De Motu* 54), and that we are, accordingly, reduced to thinking that 'there is something beside God which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable' (*Prin.* 117). Since all its attributes are negative, he concludes, 'it seems therefore to be nothing' (*De Motu* 53). All such views, Berkeley calls 'absurd notions' (*Prin.* 117).

We have arrived at that stage of the argument in which the diagnosis of the malady afflicting modern philosophy is complete. Dogmatic idealism (extreme scepticism) is seen as the inevitable consequence of a certain way of thinking (transcendental realism or materialism) which must be deluded because its consequences are either absurd or impossible. The last half of the argument contains the remedy. So deceptive in nature are the early stages of this remedy that it appears as though Kant and Berkeley are victims of a self-inflicted malady—the very same malady they seek to cure. The argument proceeds by accepting, what are, in fact, idealist or sceptical premisses.

Fourth Step

The remedy consists first, in pointing out to the philosophers a truth they already know, namely that the *esse* of ideas or appearances is *percipi*.

Kant : Sceptical idealism thus constrains us to have recourse to the only refuge still open, namely, the ideality of all appearances . . . for we cannot be

sentient of what is outside ourselves, but only of what is in us (A378). All appearances are not in themselves *things*; they are nothing but ideas, and cannot exist outside our mind (A492).

Berkeley: The philosophers . . . being of the opinion that . . . the things immediately perceived are ideas which exist only in the mind (*Hylas* III).

The philosophers must admit the truth of this premiss because it is their own. They had used it whilst correcting the views of the common man, who holds that the things immediately perceived are external bodies which exist independently of being perceived. The philosophers corrected this 'mistake of the vulgar'.¹⁵ In the above passages, Kant and Berkeley use the terms 'Vorstellung' and 'idea' to refer to the immediate data of sense. Things immediately perceived, i.e., appearances, are identified with these ideas. No claim is made at this stage that these ideas are real or permanent. No criterion is provided to distinguish reality from the idle visions of fancy or from dreams. As a result of the next step, the denotation of 'idea' increases enormously.

Fifth Step

The remedy continues by assimilating the so-called external bodies of the philosophers into the realm of ideas or appearances.

Kant: External bodies are mere appearances, and are therefore nothing but a species of my ideas, the objects of which are something only through these ideas. Apart from them they are nothing (A370. Cf. A491, *Proleg.* 13).

Berkeley: As to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their *esse* is *percipi*, nor is it possible they should have any existence, out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them (*Prin.* 3).

This is the point of departure from the doctrine of the philosophers, and it would seem to plunge Kant and Berkeley even deeper into scepticism. Berkeley may be conscious of this association but does not admit it. Kant, however, concedes, 'Up to this point I am one in confession with the above idealists' (*Proleg.* Appx.). In fact, the above passage is Kant's explicit formulation of what he calls his 'transcendental idealism' (A491). In this step, the realm of ideas has been extended radically to accommodate the contents of all possible outer experience. Its significance is most clearly grasped in its application to the distinction of the philosophers between the primary and secondary qualities. Kant observes that since Locke's time it has been generally assumed that the secondary qualities of bodies, such as heat, colour and taste, belong only to their appearances and do not exist outside our ideas. He adds, 'I go farther and, for weighty reasons, rank as mere appearances the remaining qualities of bodies also, which are called primary—such as extension, place, and, in general, space, with all that which belongs to it' (*Proleg.* 13). Berkeley has at least three different arguments

¹⁵E.g., Malebranche, *Recherche . . .*, VI^e *Éclaircissement*, 'Les hommes ont toujours consulté leurs yeux pour s'assurer de l'existence de la matière. . . . Ils pensent qu'il ne faut qu'ouvrir les yeux pour s'assurer qu'il y a des corps. . . . Cependant il est certain (que toutes les qualités sensibles dans les corps qui semblent les exhiler ou les répandre) ne sont point hors de l'âme qui les sent'.

against this distinction, but the one which is uniquely his, and on which he rests his whole case, is the argument: 'It is evident . . . that extension, figure and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance' (*Prin.* 9). This is an application of Berkeley's main argument against the doctrine of material substance. The latter is used repeatedly in the *Principles* and the *Dialogues*. It is a sceptical or idealist argument, but has more power than any of the relevant arguments of the great sceptical precursors of Berkeley, such as Bayle. Their arguments from relativity cannot affect Locke's official position (see above, note 11), whereas I think Berkeley's argument demolishes it.

From all this, it is readily seen that the fourth and fifth steps of this central argument represent the idealism of Kant and Berkeley. The fourth step showed that the *esse* of ideas or appearances is *percipi*. The fifth shows that the *esse* of the external bodies of the philosophers is also *percipi*. The term 'idea' or '*Vorstellung*' has snowballed in meaning. As before, no claim is yet made that these ideas are real or permanent. They are phantasms, of the same stuff as dreams, having the same ontological status as the ideas of Locke and the Cartesians. All that has occurred is a notable increase in the denotation of the term. The early critics of Kant and Berkeley evidently interpreted this temporary stage as their final position. We have noticed this response in Kant's case (see above p. 228). It was voiced more confidently and widely in the case of Berkeley. James Beattie wrote of 'this absurd doctrine'.¹⁶ David Hume considered Berkeley the best of all teachers of scepticism: 'All his arguments, though otherwise intended, are, in reality, merely sceptical'.¹⁷ Either Hume neglected the important final step in the whole argument, or he thought it failed.

Sixth Step

And all these appearances are real.

Kant: I leave things as we obtain them by the senses their reality (*Proleg.* 13). In order to arrive at the reality of outer objects, I have just as little need to resort to inference as I have in regard to the reality of the object of my inner sense. . . . For in both cases alike the objects are nothing but ideas, the immediate perception of which is at the same time a sufficient proof of their reality (A371).

An empirical realist allows to matter, as appearance, a reality which does not permit of being inferred, but is immediately perceived (A371).

Berkeley: I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them (*Hylas* III).

I might as well doubt of my own being, as of the being of those things I actually see and feel. . . . Those immediate objects of perception, which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves (*Hylas* III).

¹⁶In his *Essays* (Edinburgh 1776), p. 183, he continued, 'If all men were in one instant deprived of their understanding by almighty power, and made to believe that matter has no existence but as an idea in the mind, all other earthly things remaining as they are . . . I am certain that, in less than a month after, there could not without another miracle, be one human creature alive on the face of the earth', and added in a footnote that whilst a blind or deaf man can survive, it would be impossible for all mankind if they lost their perceptive faculties.

¹⁷*Enquiry*, XII, i, note.

If by *material substance* is meant only sensible body, that which is seen and felt . . . then I am more certain of matter's existence than you, or any other philosopher, pretend to be (*Hylas* III).

This step concludes the argument. Having consorted with idealism in order to refute transcendental realism, a procedure which was, for Kant, the 'only alternative' (B72), a 'recourse to the only refuge' (A378), and for Berkeley, an appeal to a truth, 'so near and obvious to the mind' (*Prin.* 6); and, on the face of it, having left no avenue of escape from the negative conclusions of the sceptics, the two men now divorce themselves from it. Accordingly, this final step in the central argument constitutes Kant's and Berkeley's refutation of idealism or scepticism and, by the same token, their proof of the external world. From it, emerges their empirical realism. The argument achieves this in a most ingenious yet simple way, by accepting the sceptical conclusion of one such as Hylas, that all we can ever know of the external world is certain ideas or appearances, and then admitting, as any consistent empiricist must, that these appearances are real. After all, it is a jest to hold, as do the philosophers, that the things we see and touch are mere illusions.¹⁸

There are, of course, difficulties in such a proof of the external world as this, the main one being the problem of error or illusion. If external bodies are reduced to mere ideas, it might seem that the external world is thereby reduced to the level of dreams. Locke had said, 'To make our knowledge real, it is requisite that the ideas answer their archetypes'.¹⁹ It might seem that neither Kant nor Berkeley, in spite of the ingenuity of their final step, has escaped from that extreme form of scepticism which each was most anxious to avoid, to wit, dogmatic idealism. Both men posed and answered this objection (in the first edition of the *Critique* and in the *Principles*, respectively) long before it was made in fact by their detractors. Berkeley had the prescience, remarkable but unavailing, to give it pride of place as the First Objection in the *Principles* (34-40). The critics, however, in both cases, proved to be either negligent or unconvinced. As Kant said about Hume, both men 'suffered the usual misfortune of metaphysicians, of not being understood'. In answering the critics, Kant asserts that the above objection rises from an 'almost intentional misconception, as if my doctrine turned all things of the world of sense into mere illusion' (*Proleg.* 13). The same objection prompts Berkeley's: 'It is a misapprehension that I deny the reality of sensible things' (*Hylas* III). Both men then proceed to reaffirm their previous answer.

¹⁸This final step illuminates the irony inherent in Dr. Johnson's notorious ostensive refutation of Berkeley's 'ingenious sophistry', by exclaiming, while 'striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it "I refute it thus"'. Such an argument, and also G. E. Moore's celebrated proof of an external world, 'By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, "Here is one hand", and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, "and here is another"', amount to nothing but vindications of the empirical realism of Kant and Berkeley. See *Life of Johnson*, Globe Edition, Macmillan, London, 1929, p. 162; and G. E. Moore, 'Proof of an External World', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. 25, 1939, p. 295.

¹⁹*Essay*, IV, iv .8.

The distinction between reality and illusion retains its full force. Its criterion is not the futile correspondence of our ideas with external archetypes, but merely their coherence within our experience. In effect, there are no illusions of sense, only delusions of the understanding, because the senses tell no lies. Kant declares, 'It is not the senses, however, which must be charged with the illusion, but the understanding' (*Proleg.* 13). Error occurs on the level of judgment. Thus, when we connect our ideas 'according to the rules of the coherence of all knowledge in experience, illusion or truth will arise according as we are negligent or careful'.²⁰ He illustrates an 'illusion of sense' by the apparent progressive and retrogressive motion of the planets (*ibid.*). Berkeley tells us that the objection vanishes once we but place 'the reality of things in ideas, fleeting indeed, and changeable; however not changed at random, but according to the fixed order of Nature' (*Hylas* III). Real things are 'more strong, orderly and coherent' than the irregular visions of fancy (*Prin.* 33). A man's 'mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately', for error here is impossible, 'but in the wrong judgment he makes'. He illustrates an 'illusion of sense' by the apparent lack of motion of the earth (*Hylas* III).

V

The central argument, which I have drawn attention to, constitutes the common ground of Kant and Berkeley. They did, of course, proceed to supplement it along different lines peculiar to their separate systems. Before we consider what conclusions may be drawn from the fact that the two men share the central argument, let us notice the important ways in which Kant differs from Berkeley as exhibited in the passages of the 'refutations'. These ways are concerned with Kant's treatment of: the self, the reality of common things and the nature of space.

First, although Kant and Berkeley agree that we know the external world as immediately as we know ourselves, the self which Kant refers to here is merely the empirical self. From it he distinguishes the self proper, the transcendental subject, which is an unthinking, and, to us, an entirely unknown, being (A380, 492). Berkeley makes no such distinction, holding that we know our real selves, not in the same way as we know ideas, but, still immediately, by reflex act and notionally (*Hylas* III). This important difference does not affect the central argument because, in it, the nature of that self which is known immediately is not in question. All that is sought is the equality in immediacy of knowledge of the outside world with it.

Secondly, at the close of the argument, we saw that the reality of common things was secured by appealing to the criteria of their immediate perception and their coherence within experience. The questions of their cause and of the ground of the coherence of our ideas were not treated, because in these matters, Kant and Berkeley differ. In Berkeley's case, the cause of

²⁰*Cf.* B69, 'It would be my own fault, if out of that which I ought to reckon as appearance, I made mere illusion', also A376-7, A492, *Proleg.* 49.

the sensible world is God. He is the ground of its 'steadiness, order, and coherence'. Our ideas change, not at random, but according to the fixed order of Nature, the rules or laws of which, open to discovery by us, constitute God's will. For Kant, the non-sensible, but purely intelligible, 'cause of appearances in general' is the transcendental object. This is not material substance, but is the 'ground (to us unknown) of the appearances'. To it 'we can ascribe the whole extent and connection of our possible perceptions' (A380, 494). It is, therefore, the cause, not only of real things (those connected in accordance with the laws of empirical advance) but of the fixed order of Nature. The transcendental object, therefore, replaces Berkeley's God.²¹

Kant, however, provides additional criteria of the reality of outer objects. I have so far considered only those which he shares with Berkeley. The first of these was immediate perception. Kant often speaks as if nothing else is needed. He asserts that it is 'a sufficient proof' of the reality of outer objects. He accepts the existence of matter on the 'unaided testimony of our mere self-consciousness'. The other criterion shared with Berkeley was coherence within experience. This involves, not only actual perception, but judgment by the understanding. Thus, for example, the dagger before Macbeth's eyes is certainly perceived. However, unlike the dagger which he draws, it lacks objective reality, and Macbeth is able to correct his earlier judgment, and to regard the former dagger as a mere 'dagger of the mind'. Whilst this example illustrates the criterion of coherence within experience for both men, the coherence is differently explained. Berkeley rests it upon the comparison of ideas. Kant accepts such comparison, but states that *a priori* concepts of the understanding must be 'superadded' (*Proleg.* 20). In the passages of the 'refutations', however, the formal conditions underlying the criterion are implied, rather than stated, giving the impression that they are, indeed, superadded.²² A typical statement of the criterion is: 'Whatever is connected with a perception according to empirical laws, is actual' (A376).²³ This accords with the second *Postulate of Empirical*

²¹Whether Kant intends to identify the transcendental object with the thing-in-itself is doubtful. Authorities differ. Kemp Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 204, regards the doctrine of the transcendental object as a pre-Critical, or semi-Critical, survival. Paton, *op. cit.*, p. 423, disagrees, and identifies it with the thing-in-itself. Whether Kant intends to identify it with God is equally doubtful. However, Kant's God, whose existence 'we not only may, but *must*, assume', has the same role as that of the transcendental object as described in the text to this note. Not in any of the passages of the 'refutations' but in the appendix to the *Transcendental Dialectic*, Kant argues that 'the world is a sum of appearances; and there must therefore be some transcendental ground of the appearances', responsible for 'the order of the world and of its connection in accordance with universal laws'. But, by assuming this 'all-sufficient cause', Kant asks, 'Do we then extend our knowledge beyond the field of possible experience?' and answers, 'By no means. All that we have done is merely to presuppose a something, a merely transcendental object, of which, as it is in itself, we have no concept whatsoever' (A696-8). It is needless to indicate, however, that for Kant, such an object is only an 'object in *idea* and not in reality', which must be used regulatively and not constitutively.

²²For example, *Proleg.* 49, 'This doubt (regarding reality) may easily be disposed of, and we always do so in common life by investigating the connection of appearances in both space and time according to universal laws of experience'.

²³*Cf.* A493; *Proleg.* 13, 49.

Thought,²⁴ in which it is shown that, under the guidance of the *Analogies of Experience*, we can know that an object is real. In the *Analogies*, it is shown that knowledge must conform to *a priori* concepts.²⁵ According to Kant, we are thus able to make the transition from awareness of our own ideas to cognition of outer objects, or, in other words, from our perceptions to objectively valid judgments. Apart from this condition, there can be no knowledge, but merely 'a rhapsody of perceptions'.²⁶ The above criterion is stressed in the early 'refutations'.²⁷ It is used directly against the sceptical idealism of Descartes on three occasions. Since the formal conditions of this criterion are, as Kant states, 'superadded,' the central argument is not affected thereby. They do mark an important divergence from Berkeley's 'pre-Critical' doctrine, but Kant never directly developed it against Berkeley. An additional criterion is the assumption of the thing-in-itself. In the passages of the 'refutations' this is stressed on only one occasion (*Proleg.* 13). It is the existence of the things behind the appearances, causing these appearances in us, which makes Kant's doctrine 'the very contrary' of idealism. Berkeley's idealism fails because it denies, not the existence of bodies in space, but things-in-themselves. This recourse is completely out of line with the other 'refutations', and indeed, with the Critical philosophy. The illegitimate appeal to this criterion, coming as it does, just after Kant had read the Garve-Feder review, gives the impression of desperation. Kant has not yet found his 'certain criterion' which distinguishes his doctrine from that of Berkeley.

Thirdly, although in the penultimate step of the central argument we saw that Kant and Berkeley are as one on the question of the *ideality* of space and its appearances (that is, all things perceived or perceivable have no existence outside our minds), Kant proceeds to superimpose his characteristic doctrine that space (but not the things in it) is not only ideal, but inheres in us as a pure form of sensibility prior to all experience. Kant uses the *a priori* character of space as an additional criterion of reality, but not until late in the 'refutations'. It turns out to be the essence of Kant's answer to Berkeley. Unlike the other divergences, which occur after the conclusion of the central argument, this one may affect the final step. It is, therefore, significant to my thesis, and will be considered in the next section.

²⁴That which is bound up with the material conditions of experience, that is, with sensation, is actual' (A218).

²⁵Specifically, to the '*a priori* transcendental unity of apperception' (A177).

²⁶In spite of such seemingly sure guidance, Kant encounters difficulties in distinguishing, in fact, an objectively valid judgment from a subjective perception. In the *Prolegomena*, he distinguishes between judgments of perception and judgments of experience. The former, e.g., 'Sugar is sweet', involves merely the comparison of ideas and contains no necessity or universality. The latter, e.g., 'The sun warms the stone', has undergone the addition of a concept of the understanding, and is inter-subjectively valid (*Proleg.* 19, 20). This tenuous distinction is relinquished in the second edition of the *Critique*, for it is clear that if one kind of judgment must conform to the formal condition, so must the other.

²⁷See note 22 and accompanying text.

In spite of these differences, the central argument is unified and complete. Before we proceed to consider Kant's direct treatment of Berkeley's doctrine, let us see what conclusions may be drawn from the fact that the above argument, as it now stands, is shared by both men. In the history of philosophy, this argument is the unique property of Kant and Berkeley. Whilst no other philosopher, to my knowledge, has produced it, many have asserted some of the individual steps, some, like the sceptics or idealists, more than others; but none has either presented these steps in such a characteristic fashion or conjoined them. First, there is the incisive analysis of the existing situation, which, by its complete antagonism to the tone of the age, separates Kant and Berkeley from the vast majority of other thinkers. Allied to this, is their exclusive disclosure of the source of the delusion inherent in modern philosophy, and their singular deduction of its inevitable consequences, temporarily in sceptical, and ultimately in dogmatic, idealism. Next, there is the deliberate acceptance (one may almost add, exploitation) of sceptical arguments. Kant and Berkeley develop this stage in different directions,²⁸ but what they share, viz., 'the ideality of all appearances', and the consequent assimilation of the external bodies of the philosophers into the realm of mere appearance, they share only with the sceptics. Finally, in their refutation of dogmatic idealism (the deepest scepticism) with its attendant proof of an external world, they leave the whole field far behind. Berkeley's refutation of scepticism, with his parallel vindication of common-sense, was one of his main aims. His argument to implement it, developed in the *Dialogues* rather than in the *Principles*, is perhaps the most singular feature in his whole philosophy. This simple, but devastating, turning of the game played by scepticism against itself²⁹ was original with Berkeley. When this is conjoined with the other steps to make his main argument, Berkeley's contribution must be considered as unique up to his time.

Seventy years later, Kant developed an argument in which the parallel with Berkeley's is exact in some features and close in others. This becomes more evident once we realize the fact (strangely neglected by commentators) that Kant most often uses the term 'idealism' (a word which Berkeley never used) to mean what Berkeley means by the term 'scepticism'. Kant shares with Berkeley what is perhaps the latter's most singular feature and uses it to turn the tables on idealism. He conjoins with it the other steps of the argument in a fashion characteristic of none of his precursors (including Hume) except Berkeley.

From the considerations summarized above, and, for the time being, from these alone, I may say at once that Berkeley anticipated Kant in the latter's central argument of the 'refutations'. I go further and, for weighty reasons, conclude that it is inherently likely that Kant was thoroughly familiar with Berkeley's doctrine and learned from it.

²⁸As we have seen, and as Hume implies, Berkeley provides stronger arguments than any of his sceptical precursors. (See above, p. 234.)

²⁹See Richard H. Popkin, 'Berkeley and Pyrrhonism', *Review of Metaphysics*, V, 2, (Dec., 1951), which brings out this point with great clarity.

VI

There are four difficult sets of facts which my theory must explain. These are : (1) Kant's many obvious misinterpretations of Berkeley's doctrine ; (2) Kant's vehement denial that his own doctrine resembles Berkeley's ; (3) Kant's extreme animus, reserved, amongst philosophers, for Berkeley alone ; (4) Kant's omission of any direct treatment of Berkeley's doctrine in the first edition of the *Critique* ; his promise to deal with it, and his failure to do so ; his belated indication, in the appendix of the *Prolegomena* and in the second edition of the *Critique*, that Berkeley's doctrine had already been undermined in the *Aesthetic*. Of these, the first three are readily accounted for on the accepted theory, according to which, Kant was largely ignorant of Berkeley's philosophy. This theory can, not quite so readily, explain the fourth. On the face of them, none of them supports my theory. The most important is the first, which seems to demolish my theory. Clearly, Berkeley did not deny the reality of the sensible world ; Kant says that he did. Such gross misinterpretation surely indicates profound misunderstanding. However, this first set of facts, when properly assessed and interpreted, yields a contrary view. The remaining facts are so illuminated thereby, that the accepted theory is rendered improbable, whilst my view, that Kant was thoroughly familiar with Berkeley's doctrine and understood it well, becomes the only adequate explanation.

Kant's official view of Berkeley's doctrine is found in five short passages, one in the first edition of the *Critique*, and two each in the *Prolegomena* and the second edition of the *Critique*.³⁰ The objection to Berkeley's doctrine, common to all the passages, is that it is a philosophy of illusionism : Berkeley denies the reality of bodies. In only one passage (*Proleg.* 13),³¹ are these bodies held to be external, in the sense of being transcendently outside us. Therefore, the burden of Kant's official view is that Berkeley denies the reality of bodies *in space*, or, in Kant's words, he ' regards the things in space as merely imaginary entities (*Einbildungen*) ' (B274). Kant's official view does seem to arise from a misconception of Berkeley's doctrine, and therefore to stem from ignorance. This accords with the accepted theory. However, such a theory loses weight immediately, when it is pointed out that Kant rarely agrees with anyone,³² and that his customary procedure in discussing the views of other philosophers, is to present, not their real views, but rather the consequences he considers to be entailed by them. These Kantian consequences are then ascribed to the philosophers as their own views. For example, although Kant studied Leibniz's works carefully, he ascribes to him views which Leibniz never held.³³ Therefore, even if

³⁰Numbered by me, II, IV, VI, VII, VIII. See above, p. 227.

³¹See above, p. 238.

³²Hume is about the only philosopher to whom he acknowledges a debt. See *Proleg.*, Introduction.

³³Cf. A39-40. On this matter, Kemp Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 140, note 6, observes : ' Kant, following his usual method in the discussion of opposing systems, is stating what he regards as being the logical consequences of certain of Leibniz's tenets, rather than his avowed position '. Similar considerations apply to Kant's account of Newton (A39-40).

Kant had studied Berkeley's writings as carefully as he studied those of Leibniz, it is likely that his account of Berkeley's doctrine would be distorted. From this consideration, it may be safely observed that Kant's misinterpretations of Berkeley's doctrine are, at least, compatible with the theory that he was thoroughly familiar with it.

Of the five passages, the last three are most relevant, because, not until he began them, had Kant finally settled on a way to treat Berkeley. Although they seem to indicate misconception, nevertheless they secrete Kant's real view of Berkeley. Kant's final account of Berkeley's doctrine is as follows :

He maintains that space, with all the things of which it is the inseparable condition, is something which is in itself impossible ; and he therefore regards the things in space as merely imaginary entities. Dogmatic idealism is unavoidable, if space be interpreted as a property that must belong to things in themselves. For in that case space, and everything to which it serves as condition, is a non-entity. The ground on which this idealism rests has already been undermined by us in the Transcendental Aesthetic [B274, my italics].

It will be noticed that this passage contains an essential part of Kant's own doctrine. It is, in fact, a summary of the logical decline of transcendental realism, presented in the first three steps of the central argument of the 'refutations' : doctrine which, as we have seen, is just as much Berkeley's as it is Kant's. The important question is : Does Kant know that Berkeley shares it ? I think he does. It is certain that Kant ascribes to Berkeley his own denial of the absolute reality of space and the external bodies in it, i.e., his denial of transcendental realism. This is evident from the first sentence. But Kant holds also that Berkeley had drawn the ultimate logical consequence from the realist position, viz., dogmatic idealism, with its denial, not only of the reality of absolute space, but of the reality of the whole sensible world. In other words, Kant ascribes to Berkeley his own doctrine, that once transcendental realism is upheld, dogmatic idealism (complete illusion), is unavoidable. The only other passage which treats of Berkeley directly in the second edition of the *Critique* bears this out. The passage was added at the end of the *Aesthetic*. Here, Kant asserts that his principle of the ideality of appearances does not entail illusion. The contrary is the case : ' It is only if we ascribe objective reality ' to space and time, that it becomes impossible for us to prevent everything being transformed thereby into mere illusion ' (B70). Then, after indicating the absurdities involved in the notion of such entities, he concludes that, accordingly,

We cannot blame the good Berkeley for *degrading bodies to mere illusion* [B71, my italics].

Since Kant asserts by implication that dogmatic idealism or illusionism is avoidable if one does not uphold the absolute reality of space, it follows that a way of escape is left open for himself and Berkeley ; not so for the transcendental realists. Kant would have to admit that we must ' blame ' Newton, Leibniz, More, Clarke and Locke for inconsistency, and Descartes and Malebranche for refraining from taking the last logical step ; he would have to admit that we must ' blame ' all transcendental realists for not seeing what he and Berkeley saw. From all this, it is evident that Kant is con-

sciously ascribing to Berkeley his own insights which are presented in the first three steps of the central argument of the 'refutations'.³⁴

We have seen that another essential part of Kant's doctrine is his principle, called by him, 'the ideality of all appearances', a principle also shared with Berkeley. But of even more significance than the fact that they share it, is the additional fact that Kant is aware of it. This is evident from the remaining relevant passage on Berkeley in the appendix to the *Prolegomena*. Here, Kant makes a striking admission—one he makes nowhere else. He attributes to Berkeley the view that space and its contents have no absolute reality, but instead, are nothing but appearances; then he admits that he is 'one in confession' with Berkeley on this doctrine. In other words, Kant is here consciously ascribing to Berkeley what amounts to his own insights embodied in the fourth and fifth steps of the central argument.³⁵ In the same passage Kant reveals additional knowledge:

Berkeley regarded space as a mere empirical idea that, like the appearances it contains, is, together with its determinations, known to us only by means of experience or perception.

A line later, he adds that 'Berkeley did not consider' the subject of time. Kant's account of Berkeley on space is accurate, and his remark on time would be accurate, had he read only the *Dialogues*³⁶ and *De Motu*. We now know, therefore, not only that Kant and Berkeley hold in common the central argument, but that Kant is aware he shares almost all of it with Berkeley; and we also know that Kant has reliable additional knowledge. My assessment of the evidence reveals on Kant's part, not ignorance of Berkeley's philosophy, but sure comprehension.

Although Kant must admit that illusionism is avoidable by himself and Berkeley, he means that, while he succeeds, Berkeley fails. The italicized portions of the above passages reveal this. Since Berkeley does not intend to degrade bodies to mere illusion, Kant's assertion that he does is a misinterpretation. Kant, almost throughout, speaks as though he really believes that Berkeley intends to be a whole-hearted dogmatic idealist; but there is one exception. In the last passage we have been considering, Kant gives more detailed treatment of the difference between him and Berkeley than anywhere else. Here we see that Kant departs from Berkeley's view, not on the question of the ideality of space and its appearances, but on its *a priori* nature. The distinction between *ideality* and the *a priori* (often neglected by authorities) is clarified in this passage. Kant agrees with Berkeley that space is ideal, but whereas the latter holds that it is learned from experience, Kant holds he has proved that 'it inheres in us as a pure form of our sensibility before all perception or experience'. Because of this, it can afford the certain criterion for distinguishing truth from illusion therein'. He adds:

³⁴See above, pp. 229-32.

³⁵See above, pp. 232-4.

³⁶In these, however, occurs the one significant observation: 'Do I not acknowledge a two-fold state of things, the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and eternal? The former was created in time; the latter existed from everlasting in the mind of God' (*Hylas* III). The subject is accorded only two paragraphs (97-8) in the *Principles*.

It follows from this that . . . experience, according to Berkeley, can have no criteria of truth because its phenomena (according to him) have nothing *a priori* at their foundation, whence *it follows* that experience is nothing but sheer illusion [my italics].

Kant thus holds that illusion is a necessary consequence of Berkeley's view, not that it is Berkeley's view. His highly significant admission makes it more than likely that Kant's repeated assertions elsewhere to the effect that Berkeley actually believes in dogmatic idealism are instances of Kant's habit of ascribing to other philosophers what are, in fact, consequences drawn by Kant himself.³⁷ It follows that Kant's knowledge of Berkeley's philosophy is still more accurate than was previously thought. Since the misinterpretations stem from accurate knowledge, they are deliberate, and are, therefore, more properly called 'perversions'. The same analysis comprehends Kant's denial that his doctrine at all resembles Berkeley's. For this just is not so. We have Kant's own admission that it is not. One would also expect misinterpretation and denial of resemblance, both of which stem from full knowledge, to be symptoms of animus. This is most likely the case. We have already noticed remarks which indicate that Kant desires his readers to know that he finds Berkeley's teaching abhorrent.³⁸

This brings us to the question of Kant's promise, in the first edition of the *Critique*, to deal with Berkeley's doctrine, and his failure to do so. In the fourth *Paralogism*, Kant's position is made to resemble Berkeley's more closely than anywhere else. We now know that there is, not only resemblance, but Kant's awareness of it. If he had sought to refute Berkeley in the next section, he must have ended in hopeless confusion, for he would have been refuting himself. He therefore did not even try. A niggardly description of Berkeley's doctrine was his only recourse. However, the Göttingen review and similar criticisms made it imperative for Kant to define his difference from Berkeley. He appealed first, to his assumption of the thing-in-itself, and then to the *a priori* character of space. Although the latter is a legitimate difference, Kant's appeal to it in this connection (as a guard against illusion, which Berkeley lacked), creates difficulties. We have seen that, throughout the 'refutation', transcendental realism entails illusion, not because it lacks the assumption of space as a prior condition of all experience (because it already makes this assumption), but because it distinguishes outer appearances from the senses. The Kantian antidote to this is not the *a priori* nature of space, but its ideality or subjectivity, which assimilates space and its contents into the realm of ideas, and thus *prevents* illusion.³⁹

³⁷See above, note 33 and text. In the case of Newton and Leibniz, however, Kant is usually more careful. For them, he uses phrases such as: 'They have to admit', and 'They are obliged to deny'. Cf. A39-40.

³⁸See above, p. 228. In addition, the epithet, 'the good Berkeley', should be contrasted with 'the illustrious' or 'the celebrated', which are reserved for other philosophers. He calls the sceptical idealist 'a benefactor of human reason'.

³⁹This is made clear at A378, *Proleg.* 13, B69-70. It is, moreover, the principle of ideality which saves *all* outer appearances, i.e. all possible experience, for the application of mathematical knowledge. Kant's additional doctrine of the *a priori* character of

Finally, my suggestion that Kant's deliberate misinterpretations of Berkeley's doctrine were prompted by animus calls for further explanation. The vulgar view of Berkeley, then as now, was of a befooled enthusiast who sought notoriety by his paradoxes.⁴⁰ Moreover, Kant abhorred all things mystical⁴¹ and visionary, and classified Berkeley's idealism as such. To acknowledge debt to such a man, or even to admit affinity, was quite out of the question for Kant. However, in the history of philosophy, instances of Horace's *odi et amo* are by no means rare; the prime example being the relation between Aristotle and Plato. As a result of my reassessment of the evidence, I hold that Kant carefully studied and fully comprehended the writings of the eccentric Irishman. I also suggest that, whilst he may very well have deplored some of Berkeley's conclusions, nevertheless he noted those insights which contributed to the solution of the problem of modern philosophy, and made them his own. My thesis is summarized by Ernst Mach: 'Berkeley's point of view (was) secretly preserved by Kant'.⁴²

COLIN M. TURBAYNE

University of Washington.

space is designed to give this mathematical knowledge its apodeictic certainty. However, in certain passages of the second edition (particularly B44), Kant seeks to confuse the *a priori* and the *subjective* elements, using the word 'ideality' to embrace both.

⁴⁰The remark of Leibniz is representative: 'I suspect that he is one of those people who seek to become famous by their paradoxes' (Letter to des Bosses, 15 Mar. 1715).

⁴¹Kant's reactions to the impressions of his friend, George Hamann, after reading the first edition of the *Critique*, are recorded: 'Owing to its high ideals, he thought the book might be called "Mysticism" as well as the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He told Kant that he liked his work, "all except the mysticism". Kant, who had a dread of everything of the kind, was astonished' (J. H. W. Stickenberg, *Life of Immanuel Kant*, Macmillan, London, 1862, p. 269).

⁴²Quoted by A. V. Vasiliev, *op. cit.*, p. 85.