

A DEFENSE OF DUALISM¹

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I argue here (in *Part II*) for mind-body dualism — a dualism of substances, not merely of properties. I also investigate (in *Part III*) dualism's relevance to the question of whether one can survive the death of one's body. Naturally the argument occurs in a philosophical context, and (in *Part I*) I begin by making that context explicit.

PART I: CONTEXT

Necessity

Standard definitions of logical necessity tell us something like this: a proposition P is logically necessary if and only if $\text{not-}P$ is correctly expressed in a sentence S that has a proper logical inscription whose form is Q and $\text{not-}Q$. Logically necessary truth is exposed by specifying the formally contradictory structure of its denial — by what we might call *logical specification*. Yet, since every proposition has its modalities with necessity, the proposition expressed by *Some proposition has its modalities contingently* is necessarily false, but fails to exhibit the requisite form. Nor is it clear exactly how to remedy that defect, if defect it be. So logical specification will not reveal its necessity (or that of other examples), and we hear talk of “broad” logical necessity.

Related to these issues is the fact that while every necessarily true proposition is entailed by every other (and by every contingent proposition), it is false that every necessarily true proposition is strictly *contradicted* by the denial of every other necessary truth, let alone by the denial of any contingent proposition.² It is hard to see how to deal with that fact without some recourse to a notion of necessity broader than that provided by logically specifiable necessity.

The proposition *Water is H₂O*, assuming it to correctly report an essence that water mind -independently possesses, is necessarily true, but *Water is not H₂O* lacks contradictory structure. Similar remarks go for *Water is essentially H₂O* and *Water is not essentially H₂O*. So logical specification will not



reveal their necessity, and we hear talk of “metaphysical” necessity.

I take it that talk of *broad logical necessity* supposes that logical impossibility sometimes is, but sometimes is not, identifiable via logical specification. Roughly, sometimes semantic considerations, and sometimes discovery of natural essences, are required if we are to expose logical contradiction. Talk of metaphysical necessity tends to mean something like this: *There are metaphysically necessary propositions* is understood in the context of these claims: (i) essentialism is true [every substance has an essence, and there are substances]; (ii) conventionalism in logic is false; (iii) propositions that correctly ascribe essences to substances are true with logical necessity, and (iv) not every logically necessary proposition is identifiable as necessary by logical specification. Roughly, then, insofar as our talk about substances is properly shaped (insofar as we get it right about what essences substances have) our essence-ascribing propositions will possess a logical necessity not (at least by current techniques) accessible to logical specification.³ Further, talk of metaphysical necessities is in the tradition of Aristotle’s remark that the principle of non-contradiction is a law both of thought and of things that are independent of thought. Without further wandering in logical minefields, I shall here take the line that there are logical necessities that are, and others that are not, logically specifiable, and that among these are correct ascriptions of essences to substances. I will use *necessarily false*, *logically impossible*, and *is self-contradictory* in such a way that propositions having these inelegancies need not have formally contradictory denials.

Mental Properties

As a rough characterization, let us say that a property *Q* is a mental property if and only if *X has Q* entails *X is [sometimes episodically and always dispositionally] self-conscious*. One could not implausibly suggest that *being conscious* is a mental property. It is not a mental property by my definition. While *X is self-conscious* entails *X is conscious*, it does not follow that from this that *being conscious* is a mental property; *X is self-conscious* entails *X has only consistent properties* but that does not make *having only consistent properties* a mental property.⁴

Physical Properties

Not every non-mental property is a physical property; *being prime* presumably is not a physical property, nor is *having only consistent properties* or *being entailed by the axioms of modal system S5*. Without pretense of precision, I shall refer to such properties as “abstract properties” and suggest that property *Q* is a physical property if and only if *Q* is neither mental nor abstract. On this account, *X has an abstract property* does not entail *X is abstract*; minds and bodies are not abstract and they all have the property *having only consistent properties* and the property *not being prime*. I will be as generous as one could reasonably ask as to what counts as a property, but the properties that concern me here will be properties on any plausible account thereof.

Properties and Property Instances

Some philosophers think that there are properties (e.g., *being red*) and there are *property instances* (e.g., *the chair's being red* and *the pencil's being red*). Other philosophers do not think that there are properties above and beyond property instances; remove all the red property instances and there is not some further *being red*. I will be concerned here only with property instances. It is metaphysically necessary that (P1) *Nothing exists that lacks all property instances or To exist is to possess some property instance*; that is, *X exists and for any property-instance Q, it is false that X has Q* is necessarily false. Further, it is necessarily the case that (P2) *No property instance fails to be a property instance of something*. Second-order property instances characterize first-order property instances, which in turn characterize things. *The pencil's being red* is a matter of a property instance characterizing one thing, *the chair's being red* a matter of another property instance characterizing something else. Cases of a property instance that characterizes nothing are cases of there not being a property instance. If there are any properties, as opposed to property instances, presumably they are abstract objects; in any case, such items will have property instances without being property instances themselves. Hereafter, I will use "property" as an abbreviation for "property instance."

Tiny Substances

Consider the notion of a *tiny substance*: *X is a tiny substance iff X has properties and is not itself merely a bundle of properties*. An item can be a tiny substance by existing merely momentarily. The truth of (P1) and (P2) tells us that (P3) *If there is anything at all, then there are tiny substances*.

Robust Substances

Consider the notion of a *robust substance*: *X is a robust substance iff X has properties, is not itself merely a bundle of properties, and (if it is temporal) remains the same over time and through change of nonessential properties*. A robust substance is always a tiny substance (and always more than tiny), and a tiny substance may be a robust substance. There are alleged accounts of minds or bodies or states or whatever that are non-substantial in the sense of their truth not requiring the existence of tiny substances. But since (P1-P3) are necessary truths, there *are* no non-necessarily-false accounts of minds or of bodies (or of anything) that are non-substantial in the sense of their truth not requiring the existence of tiny substances, because there *cannot* be any such accounts. Any alleged account of this sort would be self-contradictory. I take it to be plainly true that (P4) *If there are changes then there are robust substances*.

Essences

An item has a generic essence if (i) it has one or more properties by virtue of which it belongs to a kind such that its not belonging to that kind would entail its not being the thing that it is, and (ii) it is logically possible that there be other things of the same kind. An item has an individual essence if

(i) it has one or more properties P that make it the thing it is such that its not having that or those properties would entail its not being the individual that it is, and (ii) it is logically impossible that any other thing have P . My concern here is with generic essences.

Dualism and Interactionism

It is standard fare to raise supposed difficulties for dualism by asking such questions as: How is something so different from the physical as is the non-physicalistically mental able to causally affect, or be causally affected by, the physical? How can what is not in space, as the non-physicalistically-mental is not, affect, or be affected by, the physical, which is in space? Won't the connection between the mental and the physical, as well as the connection between the physical and the mental, be in every case simply a brute — and therefore unintelligible — connection? Such questions about the possibility of mind-body interaction express much of the core of what there is by way of an actual argument against mind-body dualism — an argument that goes something like this: 1. The only plausible version of dualism is interactionism; 2. If the only plausible version of dualism is interactionism, then if dualism is true, interactionism is true;⁶ So: 3. If dualism is true, interactionism is true; 4. If interactionism is true, then there are causal effects of the mental on the physical and causal effects of the physical on the mental; So: 5. If dualism is true, then there are causal effects of the mental on the physical and causal effects of the physical on the mental; 6. That there are causal effects of the mental on the physical and causal effects of the physical on the mental is unthinkable; 7. What is unthinkable is false; So: 8. That there are causal effects of the mental on the physical and causal effects of the physical on the mental is false; So: 9. Dualism is false.

"Unthinkable" here may just ultimately mean "is not compatible with physicalism" in which case it will be hard to see why a dualist should either disagree or regard this as a criticism, but penultimately at any rate presumably it means something like "violates some at least putative necessary truth." Major candidates seem to be *Like can only affect like*, *What is in space can only be affected by what is in space*, and *Ultimate connections cannot be brute*. We will look at these in turn.

Like can only affect like

There is no sense of "like" in which the principle "Like can only affect like" is true and in which excitation of retinal cones produces color sensations, imbalance of ear fluids gives rise to vertigo, viruses cause viral diseases and bacteria cause bacterial diseases, the big bang produces massive mass emigration, etc. The principle either disallows such cases as stubbing one's toe causing pain, recognizing an oncoming truck yielding terror, and noting an error in reasoning leading to an onscreen correction in the manuscript, or else simply legislates that in order to occur they must be physical-physical. The so-called "Causal likeness principle" (*If A causes Q in B, then A must itself have Q*) on which causality is viewed on the old pass-along-the-bucket fire brigade model survives in contemporary philosophy only as a

way of criticizing interactionism. Since this principle is false, it should survive no longer, and anyone should be ashamed for basing criticisms of anything on it.

Logically Possible Knowledge of Abstracta

Friends of abstracta typically hold the metaphysical doctrine that the existence of abstracta provides the truth conditions for necessary truths and the epistemological doctrine that awareness of abstracta is somehow involved in our knowledge of such truths. The metaphysical view's truth is a necessary condition of the truth of the epistemological view, and since the view that persons are abstract objects has as little favor among friends of abstracta as elsewhere, this involves a doctrine of contact of some sort between non-abstract minds, however concretely construed, and abstracta. It seems plain that this view is not self-contradictory and is not a disguised twin of "Plutins plonk parastics." If the epistemological thesis in question is neither necessarily false nor gibberish, then the causal likeness principle, presumably necessarily true if true at all, is false (and hence necessarily false). Thus it is no real danger to anything or anyone except those who appeal to it to refute mind-body dualism.

What is in space can only be affected by what is in space

The contradiction in propositions properly expressed by sentences of the form (A) *A, which is non-spatial, causally affects spatial B* and (B) *Spatial B causally affects A, which is non-spatial* is not formal; these are not *Q* and *not-Q* affairs. Nor, I suggest, are they like *Ralph has drawn a rectangle but Ralph has not drawn a figure* or *Propositions have their modalities only contingently* which are necessarily false but not, so to say, syntactically so. So what, exactly, is wrong with (A) and (B) save that they associate with interactionist friends?

Ultimate connections cannot be brute

Presumably, on any account of what *Law L2 reduces to law L1* means, it will be false that every law *L* such that *L* relates instances of one physical sort to instances of another physical sort is reducible to still another physical law; presumably the proposition *L is an irreducible physical law* is neither self-contradictory nor false of all laws. Let *L** be an irreducible physical law and let *k1-phenomena* and *k2-phenomena* be the sorts of physical items *L** connects. Its connection of them will be irreducible, hence brute, hence "unthinkable." So what? The alternative is simply denying that there are any physical laws. Is that, particularly for a materialist, not "unthinkable"? It is not at all clear, physicalist prejudices aside, why brute mental-physical or physical-mental connections should be objectionable because they are brute, whereas brute physical-physical connections are not objectionable.⁷

There is an interesting version of the cosmological argument whose first premise is *If it is logically possible that there is an explanation of a true, logically contingent existential statement, then there is an explanation of its truth*. In its three-by-five card version it continues by claiming *That there is a world is a*

possibly explicable, true, logically contingent existential statement; after all, it is logically possible that there not be a physical world (or a physical world plus finite minds). It then properly draws the conclusion that *That there is a world has an explanation* and rightly notes that *there being a world* is what is up for explanation and so cannot be any part of the explanation required. It then concludes that *there being a world* has an explanation that refers to something that is not the physical world (or the physical world plus finite minds). From there it is abstract objects or God, and abstract objects don't act.

Whatever the merits of the argument (they would have to be addressed after the argument was put carefully rather than caricatured as it has been here), its first premise rejects brute facts.⁸ It will explanatorily rest only with what so exists that its existence is logically impossible to explain. The acceptance of this premise would explain physicalist enmity to brute facts, though I am not aware that it is used as a rationale in that way. The premise is, I suspect, incompatible with physicalism.

A Conclusion Concerning Interactionism

I suspect, then, that the argument against interactionism, and hence against dualism, more draws psychological support from the current philosophical culture than philosophical sustenance from sound and valid arguments. At any rate, the sorts of considerations that we have noted, while common enough in criticism of mind-body dualism, have little to commend them.

PART II: MIND-BODY DUALISM

Substance Dualism

If one holds property dualism, it does not follow that one embraces substance dualism. Substance dualism, I take it, is the view that mental properties are kind-defining and physical properties are kind-defining, that there are things of each kind so defined, and that for any item *A* that belongs to the kind *mental substance* and any item *B* that belongs to the kind *physical substance*, it is logically possible that *A* exist and *B* not exist. (Presumably it is also possible that *B* exist and *A* not exist, but I will not pursue that here.) A monotheistic dualist will restrict the range of "A" and "B" to mental substances other than God. Standardly, essentialists hold that no one noncomposite thing can have more than one essence. This, plus the view that *having physical properties* and *having mental properties* define essences, leads to the view that human persons are substantively composite.

Materials for Modal Arguments

Let *X* range over only noncomposite substances. Let *W* be an *existence-entailed* property if and only if, for any substance *X*, *X exists* entails *X has W*; *having properties*, *having only consistent properties*, and *being self-identical* are existence-entailed properties. Let a property be a *kind-defining and deep difference making property* if and only if it is *not* an existence-entailed property,

defines a kind, and something's having it is necessary to that thing's existing at all as well as to its having the sorts of causal powers and passivities it has. Then let Q range over only kind-defining and deep difference making properties and consider these forms of statements: 1. It is possible that some X have $Q1$ and lack $Q2$; 2. It is possible that some X have $Q2$ and lack $Q1$; 3. It is not possible, relative to any X , that both X has $Q1$ and X has $Q2$ are true; [and, to be explicit if redundant] 4. *Having $Q1$* and *having $Q2$* are kind-defining, deep difference making properties. Consider also these forms of statements: 5. It is possible that I exist and lack $Q1$; 6. *Having $Q1$* is not essential to me; 7. *Having $Q2$* is essential to me; 8. It is not possible that I exist and lack $Q2$. No essentialist can consistently embrace 5. and deny 6., or accept 7. and deny 8. From such materials as these, modal arguments for dualisms are built.

Modal Arguments and Dualisms

Standard arguments for property dualism and substance dualism appeal to modal arguments. Let # mean *It is logically possible that*. Also let MP range over some particular mental property, PP over any physical property, MS over some particular mental substance, and PS over any physical substance. The arguments typically and understandably focus on those physical properties with which the mental property in question might be thought to be identical and those physical substances with which the mental substance in question might be thought to be identical. The standard arguments have these forms:

Modal Argument for Property Dualism

1. # MP exists and PP does not exist; 2. If # MP exists and PP does not exist then MP is not identical to PP ; So: 3. MP is not identical to PP .

Modal Argument for Substance Dualism

4. # MS exists and PS does not exist; 5. If # MS exists and PS does not exist then MS is not identical to PS . So: 6. MS is not identical to PS .

For our purposes, the relevant substitutions regarding properties are:

7. #*I am self-conscious and I have no bodily states*.
8. If #*I am self-conscious and I have no bodily states* then *My being self-conscious is not identical to my having bodily states*. So:
9. *My being self-conscious is not identical to my having bodily states*.

The relevant substitutions regarding substances are:

10. #*I exist as a self-conscious being and I have no body*.
11. If #*I exist as a self-conscious being and I have no body* then *My existing as a self-conscious being is not identical to my having a body*. So:
12. *My existing as a self-conscious being is not identical to my having a body*.

This gives us a rough map of the conceptual neighborhood for modal arguments for mind-body dualism. It remains to be seen whether sound and valid arguments for dualism can be found there. (The particular arguments just noted are problematic.)

The Scientific Realist Objection

One objection to the possible success of such arguments is the scientific realist objection. Having used # for *It is logically possible that* let us use * for the very different notion *It is epistemically possible that* which amounts to something like *For all we know, it may be true that*. Goldbach's Conjecture presumably is either true or false, if true then necessarily true, and if false then necessarily false. Of the propositions #*Goldbach's Conjecture is true* and the proposition #*Goldbach's Conjecture is false*, one is necessarily true and one is necessarily false. But neither of the propositions **Goldbach's Conjecture is true* and **Goldbach's Conjecture is false* is false. The Scientific Realist Objection goes as follows. The property dualist argument requires that we know that 7. #*I am self-conscious and I have no bodily states*. But we do not know that 7. unless we can eliminate: 7A. **I cannot be self-conscious and have no central nervous system states*. But we cannot eliminate 7A. since someone may discover that the essence of *being self-conscious* is *being in bodily state CS* (where "CS" is defined physically) just as someone discovered that the essence of *being water* is *being H₂O*. Similarly, the substance dualist argument requires that we know 10. #*I exist as a self-conscious being and I have no body*. But we do not know that 10. unless we can eliminate: 10A. **I cannot exist as a self-conscious being and have no body*. But we cannot eliminate 10A. since someone might discover that the essence of *being a self-conscious being* is *being a body of CS type* (where "CS" is defined physically) just as someone discovered that the essence of *being water* is *being H₂O*.

The objection mistakenly ignores crucial differences between the relevant cases. The *Water is H₂O* case (assuming for the sake of the argument that the standard scientific realist account is correct) is that of a deep structure essential property, *being H₂O*, underlying and explaining such directly experienced features as *feeling wet*, *possessing buoyancy*, and the like. In the case of *being self-conscious*, it is the directly experienced property itself that is essential. The point can be made in what is by now canonical form. For any physical feature *F*, were we to discover that some Twin Earth being had *F* but lacked the phenomenological feature we refer to as *being self-aware*, *F* would not be identical on Twin Earth to self-awareness, no matter what physical feature *F* was. The argument for property dualism, then, cannot be undercut by appeals to alleged discoveries of physical deep structures regarding properties. Exactly similar considerations apply to the argument for substance dualism. It is the phenomenologically accessible property *having self-consciousness* that is an essential property of mine, whatever the related physical features may be. For any physical substance on Twin Earth, if it lacked that phenomenologically accessible property, then it would belong to a different kind than I do, no matter how similar our physical makeup; in the absence of the phenomenological feature *having self-consciousness* it will not be a person. So the scientific realist criticism of substance dualism also fails.

The modal arguments for property and substance dualism require that there be necessary truths that are not logically specifiable.⁹ They also require that reflection on logical possibilities together with introspection sometimes be sufficient to establish that a property is of one kind rather than another and to reveal that a substance has a non-physical essence. This is, of course, a

far cry from the stark empiricism for which all necessity was conventional, tautological, and empty of fact and for which only sensory observation (plus inference from what sensory observation justified) established anything. Given that this position is notoriously self-defeating, that a view is incompatible with it is hardly much of a criticism. The modal arguments require that there be essences — at least, those of persons — that are not discernible by physics (or physiology, chemistry, etc.); notoriously, physicalists deny this. But their denial is part of their physicalism, and presumably should be a *derivative* part thereof — a part for which there are good arguments that do not require the truth of physicalism as a premise. While of course the issues are complex, I think that it is far more clearly true that *Necessarily, if X is a person then X is self-conscious* than it is true either that *For any item X and essence E, if X has E then the only way in which it is discoverable that X has E is by some natural science procedure* or *For any item X, if X exists, then X is physical*. Even if *For any physical item X and essence E, if X has E then the only way in which it is discoverable that physical X has E is by some natural science procedure* this will not, by itself, provide any problem for dualist modal arguments.

The Irrelevance of Imagination

No argument offered here requires that we infer from images, or from the ways in which we can or cannot combine images, that the relevant modal claims are true. Imagination, in the sense of imaging, reflecting on images, or putting labels on images, is entirely irrelevant. To suggest otherwise is either confused or disingenuous.

Mistaken Modal Arguments

There are plenty of modal arguments that are invalid. Perhaps the most famous is: *Necessarily, P entails Q; P; hence Necessarily, Q*. For any logically contingent proposition *P*, the argument *Possibly P, so P* is obviously invalid. In contrast, the argument forms *Possibly possibly P, so possibly P*, *Possibly necessarily P, so necessarily P*, *Possibly P is contingent, so P is contingent*, and *Possibly necessarily not P, so necessarily not P* are perfectly valid. Consider an argument parallel to one for property dualism:

- P1. *#I am charitable and the state described in 1st Corinthians 13 does not exist.*
- P2. *If #I am charitable and the state described in 1st Corinthians 13 does not exist then Being charitable is not identical to the state described in 1st Corinthians 13. So:*
- P3. *Being charitable is not identical to the state described in 1st Corinthians 13.*

Since P3. is false, one of P1. and P2. must be false. Since it is possible that charity is not the quality under discussion in 1 Corinthians 13 presumably P1. is true. But then P2. is false.

Consider two arguments parallel to some arguments for substance dualism:

- P4. *#I exist and no plumbers exist.*
- P5. *If #I exist and no plumbers exist then I am not identical to some plumber. So:*

P6. *I am not identical to some plumber.*

But suppose that P6A. *I am a plumber* is true. Since P6A. is contingent, the conjunct P4. and P6A. is consistent. P6A. entails the denial of P6., and (thus) so does P4. and P6A.

But then the P4.-P6. argument is invalid. If it is invalid, then P5. is false; so P5. is false. From P4. and P5. it follows neither that P6B. *It is not possible that I am identical to some plumber* nor P6. *I am not identical to some plumber.*

Consider the argument:

P8. *#I exist and no philosophy professors exist.*

P9. *If #I exist and no philosophy professors exist then I am not identical to some philosophy professor. So:*

P10. *I am not identical to some philosophy professor.*

The problem here is that P10. is false, so that at least one of P8. and P9. must be false. Since I would still exist even if I lost my job, presumably P8. is true. So P9. is false. Thus these arguments, similar to some modal arguments for dualism, fail.

These arguments, nonetheless, are of interest for two reasons. Consider the following replacements:

(a) For P2. substitute: P2*. *If #I am charitable and the state described in 1st Corinthians 13 does not exist then Being the state described in 1st Corinthians 13 is not an essential feature of charity.*

(b) for P5. substitute P5*. *If #I exist and no plumbers exist then It is no part of my essence to be a plumber.*

(c) For P9. substitute P9*. *If #I exist and no philosophy professors exist then It is no part of my essence to be a philosophy professor.*

Note, first, that these new premises, together with the original first premises, establish true negative conclusions regarding essences. It is not a necessary feature of the property *being charitable* to be referred to in the famous Pauline chapter nor is it any part of my essence to be either a plumber or a philosophy professor. That these conclusions are hardly earthshaking is nothing against the soundness or validity of the arguments that lead to them. Note, second, that they appeal to nothing but reflection.

Some Nonmistaken Modal Arguments (?)

Consider this argument relevant to property dualism:

Argument One

PD1. *#I am self-conscious and I have no bodily states.*

PD2. *If #I am self-conscious and I have no bodily states then My having bodily states is not essential to my being self-conscious. So:*

PDC. *My having bodily states is not essential to my being self-conscious.*

This argument seems as secure as the *revised* arguments about charity, plumbers, and philosophy professors.¹⁰

Consider this argument relevant to substance dualism in which the notion of a body is the notion of any physical substance, soft or hard:

Argument Two

SD1. *#I exist as a self-conscious being and I have no body.*

- SD2. If #I exist as a self-conscious being and I have no body then My having a body is not essential to my existing as a self-conscious being. So:
- SDC. My having a body is not essential to my existing as a self-conscious being.

This negative argument too seems correct. If PDC. and SDC. are true, then neither *being self-conscious* nor *self-conscious beings* are essentially physical. That, however, is not yet property or substance dualism.

Substance Dualism

Consider this argument for a positive property dualistic conclusion:

Argument Three

- D1. #There is a property instance of being self-conscious and there is no property instance of any physical property.
- D2. If #There is a property instance of being self-conscious and there is no property instance of any physical property then a property instance of being self-conscious does not have being a physical property as its essence. So:
- D3. A property instance of being self-conscious does not have being a physical property as its essence.¹¹

Consider this positive argument for substance dualism:

Argument Four

- D4. It is not #I exist and I am not a self-conscious being.
- D5. Being a self-conscious being is not an existence-entailed property.
- D6. If it is not #I exist and I am not a self-conscious being and being a self-conscious being is not an existence-entailed property, then it is (at least part of) my essence to be a self-conscious being. So:
- D7. It is (at least part of) my essence to be a self-conscious being.

Next, consider *Argument Five*:

- D8. It is not #I exist and my self-consciousness does not exist.¹²
- D9. It is not #My self-consciousness exists and I do not exist.
- D10. If it is not #I exist and my self-consciousness does not exist and it is not #My self-consciousness exists and I do not exist then the existence of my self-consciousness is necessary and sufficient for my existence.
- D11. The existence of my self-consciousness is necessary and sufficient for my existence.
- D12. If the existence of my self-consciousness is necessary and sufficient for my existence, then my essence includes nothing other than my being self-conscious.
- D13. My essence includes nothing other than my being self-conscious.

(Note that D11. does not say anything about whether the existence of my self-consciousness does, or does not, itself depend on something other than itself, as of course it does.) Next, consider:

Argument Six

- D14. If my essence includes nothing other than my being self-conscious, and my having a body is not essential to my existing as a self-conscious being, then it is no part of my essence to have a body. So:

- D15. It is no part of my essence to have a body.
 D16. If it is no part of my essence to have a body, then it is no part of my essence to have any property the possession of which requires that I have a body. So:
 D17. It is no part of my essence to have any property the possession of which requires that I have a body.
 D18. For any physical property *Q*, my possessing *Q* requires that I have a body. So:
 D19. It is no part of my essence to have any physical property.
 D20. If it is no part of my essence to have any physical property and my essence includes nothing other than my being self-conscious, then my being self-conscious is not a physical property. So:
 D21. *My being self-conscious is not a physical property.*

These arguments, too, at least seem to escape the modal problems noted above. They bring us at least to the brink of mind-body dualism, for if we begin by granting that there are physical substances, show that there are substances whose essence is to have self-consciousness, and show that *being self-conscious* is not a physical property, then if *being self-conscious* is a mental property, there are mental substances.

Being mental as intrinsic, neither topic neutral or role-defined.

The dualist must insist that *being self-conscious* is an introspectible, intrinsically phenomenological feature not reducible to anything like *a state that fulfills role R* where *R* is causally defined. It is not a topic-neutral feature and not reducible to any other feature. Its being so goes deeply against a variety of currently highly popular assumptions and research programs.¹³ Roughly, to usefully prove that *P* is to deduce *P* from something more clearly true, or else to so elicit *P*'s meaning that its truth shines through. And, as is typically the case for fundamental claims, perhaps the best the mind-body dualist can do here, having nothing more fundamental to which to appeal, is to critique accounts of *being self-conscious* on which it is not a mental property. This task is nothing like hopeless. Materialists themselves seem quite happy to provide powerful criticisms of every variety of materialism save the brand that they themselves favor. Alternatively, of course, the mind-body dualist may assert that *If item X is mental then item X is essentially mental*. If this is so, then functionalism is not even possibly true.¹⁴

PART III: DUALISM AND EXISTENTIAL SECURITY

Even if the property dualism and substance dualism arguments entirely succeed, it may still be true that:

- M1. For any mental property *Q1*, there is some physical property *Q2* such that if *Q2* does not obtain, neither does *Q1*.
 M2. For any mental substance *M*, there is some physical substance *P* such that if *P* does not exist, neither does *M*.

Nothing in the modal arguments for property and substance dualism discussed here is sufficient to prove that mental substances do not (or do) depend for their existence on physical substances. Nothing in them, for

example, proves that M3. *If property Q is not essential to X, then X's existence does not in fact depend on X's having Q, even though it is logically possible that it not so depend* or that M4. *If X is distinct from Y, then X's existence does not in fact depend upon Y's existence, even though it is logically possible that it not so depend* — not even where one restricts X and Y to referring to non-divine things. As Descartes reluctantly granted, the truth of dualism does not entail that the soul survives the death of the body, but only that its doing so is not logically impossible. Dualism without monotheism arguably leaves the claim that human persons survive death unsupported.

Survival and Mind-body Physicalism

What, then, is the significance of the truth of mind-body dualism, if it is true, for the issue of human survival? More than might appear from the previous section. On a physicalist account of persons, persons are either bodies or bundles of physical states (and/or properties). On neither sort of physicalism does survival seem promising.

Bundle Physicalism and Survival

Consider the sort of physicalism for which a person is a set of psychological states and/or dispositional states or processes, each of which is momentary. These states will include sensations, beliefs, preferences, desires, and the like, as well as tendencies to believe, desire, prefer, and so on. Let any particular set of such states that co-exist at some time be a *momentary psychological bundle* or *MPB*.¹⁵ On this view, a particular person at a given time is one of the MPBs that exist at that time, and over time a particular person is a causally linked series of successive bundles.¹⁶

Consider the following scenario. Mary, a particular MPB, enters a transmission device that supposedly will beam her to Mars. The device misfires, sending one "Mary" to Venus and another "Mary" to Cleveland. Each new "Mary" is exactly as like the old Mary as the other, so each has equal claim to being her. Since "new Mary1" is not identical to "new Mary2," the old Mary cannot be identical to both new "Marys." The metaphysical identity conditions of an item are those features thereof that make it the item it is and not another; the epistemological identity conditions of an item are those features of an item that allow us to identify it as the item that it is. The relevant metaphysical features may or may not coincide with the relevant epistemological features. It is only metaphysical identity conditions that concern us here.¹⁷ If Mary, on entry into the device, just is an MPB, and each new "Mary" is an MPB that is related in some tight causal connection to the in-the-device MPB — however it is that MPB's allegedly get strung together in a person-making series — then each new "Mary" is (epistemology aside) metaphysically as much of a new Mary as any Mary that would have come to be had Mary entirely avoided transmission devices.

It seems to me plainly a necessary truth that:

- (N) If person *S* exists at time *T*, then there are no possible conditions under which the coexistence with *S* of something just like *S* would have prevented *S* existing at *T*.

But while (on the bundle account) Mary would have existed on Mars had there not also been a "Mary" in Cleveland, or in Cleveland had there not been a "Mary" on Mars, the existence of two "Marys" (so to say) prevents Mary from enjoying a post-transmission existence. There is (on the bundle view) no fact of the matter regarding Mary's survival. But then *Mary survives* is not true (or false), and if *Mary survives* is not true (or false) then Mary does not survive. Her hopes of space traveling go unfulfilled. So, on the bundle account, N. is false. Hence the bundle account is false.

An anti-dualistic argument runs: such cases as the Mary case are logically possible; in them, there is no matter of fact about whether Mary has survived or not; were dualism true, there would be a fact of the matter in these possible cases; so dualism is false. Of course the dualist has a response: I do exist now. Necessarily, either I will exist a moment hence, or I will not. Were there nothing more to me than MPBs, it could be false that either I will exist a moment hence or not. So it is false that there is nothing more to me than MPBs. *Either I will exist a moment hence, or I will not* is a necessary truth; so any view on which it is not true is necessarily false. So the MPB-and-nothing-more view of persons is necessarily false. The anti-dualist argument and its response indicates at least part of the point of the view that persons are simple. *Simple* in this sense can, I think, be defined as follows. An item *X* has a *particular part* if and only if *X* belongs to kind *K*, *X* has parts, and at least one of *X*'s parts also belongs to *K*. What we might call the *personalistic simplicity thesis*—that *Necessarily, if X is a person then X is simple* entails *Necessarily, if X is a person then X has no particular parts*. *Has no particular parts* is to be read strictly; it entails both *has no simultaneous particular parts* and *has no successive particular parts*. The MPB account of persons supposes that persons have successive particular parts, as the view that there is one cosmic mind of which each finite mind is a part supposes that the cosmic mind has simultaneous as well as successive particular parts. Both violate the personalistic simplicity thesis. Mind-body dualism typically, and perhaps necessarily, embraces it. The personalistic simplicity thesis typically, and perhaps necessarily, is part of monotheism, and in its application to God is to be distinguished from the view that ascribes a rather more dubious simplicity to God.

Substance Physicalism and Survival

Suppose that I am (identical to) a body *B* at time *T-1*, that I do not exist (i.e., on the view just assumed, am not identical to any body) at time *T*, and am "reconstituted" (i.e., *B*'s twin is created) at time *T+1*.¹⁸ On such a view, it is possible that two "*B*-twins" *X* and *Y* be created (twin with respect to whatever is supposed to make a single *B*-twin me again). Should this happen, there would then be no fact of the matter about my (re)existence or survival at *T+1*. After all, *X* is not numerically identical to *Y*, and so I cannot be identical to both *X* and *Y*. If there is no fact of the matter about my survival, then it is not true that I survive. So, on the reconstitution view, there are possible conditions under which the coexistence at some time with (what would otherwise have been) me of something just like me would prevent my existing. On the reconstitution view, then, N. is false. Hence the recon-

stitution view is false; a substance physicalist who thinks we survive must suppose that our bodies exist continuously. (Similar remarks apply if what is supposedly reconstituted is a mental rather than a physical substance.)

Very familiar evidence suggests that the fate of any human person's body is inelegant. It is logically possible that when, say, St. Paul died, God secretly removed his body to a heavenly freezer and replaced it by a copy which is what was buried. One could hold that St. Paul really is a hard, tiny physical pellet that is indestructible by any natural process. But these views are neither exegetically nor theologically, let alone philosophically, the sort of thing one would think of holding save under enormous conceptual duress. If they are what one is left with if one wants to hold both that persons are essentially physical and that persons survive death, one might understandably wonder if one or the other of those beliefs is false.

Conclusion

Mind-body dualism leaves open the question as to whether human persons survive death, and if dualism is true, then it is both possible that God cause persons to survive and unproblematically compatible with what we know the fate of human bodies to be that God causes persons to survive. Reconstitution, body snatching, and pellet theories are unnecessary. That is not, of course, an argument for dualism, but a consequence of dualism of interest to many monotheists — a consequence perhaps not had by any other view of the essence of persons.

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NOTES

1. I wish to indicate my indebtedness to the following philosophers on the indicated topics: **Property Dualism:** George Bealer, "Mental Properties," *The Journal of Philosophy* (1994), Vol. XCL, No. 4, 185-208; **Dualism:** Alan Donagan, "Realism and Freethinking in Metaphysics," *Theoria*, (1976) Vol. 42, 1-19 **Mistaken Modal Arguments, Modal Arguments:** Richard Swinburne, *The Evolution of the Soul* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); William P. Alston and Thomas W. Smythe, "Swinburne's Argument for Dualism," *Faith and Philosophy*, (1994) Vol. 11, No. 1, 127-133; **Cartesian Dualism:** R. C. Richardson, "The Scandal of Cartesian Interactionism," *Mind* (1982), Vol. XCI, 20-37; Alan Donagan, "The Worst Excess of Cartesian Dualism," A. Donagan, N. Perovich, and M.V. Wedin (eds.), *Human Nature and Natural Knowledge* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1986), 313-325; **Personal Identity:** Richard Swinburne and Sydney Shoemaker, *Personal Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).

2. For some discussion of this, see the final chapter of the present author's *The Epistemology of Religion Experience* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

3. We could redefine "water" so as to make "Water is not H₂O" equivalent to "Water is not water," but while the necessity that essentialistic scientific real-

ism ascribes to water's being H₂O would be reflected in the structure of the denial of (redefined) "Water is H₂O," the proximate ground of the necessity would be in a real definition and the ultimate ground of the necessity would lie in the nature of water itself.

4. If one insists that mental properties come in two basic kinds, one entailing self-consciousness, and the other of that kind if and only if *X* has *Q* entails *X* is conscious but does not entail *X* is self-conscious, I will not argue. If both kinds of mental properties are kind-defining, it will follow that self-conscious beings are of a different kind than conscious-but-not-self-conscious beings. The issue likely to be of interest here concerns the ontological status of non-human animals. While that is an interesting and important issue, it is not the one I am concerned with here.

5. For a description and critique of Hume's argument that there are (and can be) only tiny substances, cf. the present author's "Continuity, Consciousness and Identity in Hume's Philosophy," *Hume Studies*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Nov., 1992, pp. 255-274.

6. It is false that it follows from *P1*'s being the most plausible version of theory *T* that if *T* is true, then *P1* is true, and were the argument in which premise 2. appears otherwise in order, it would require revision here. Since it is not otherwise in order, I will not worry about providing that revision.

7. Berkeley offered one's ability to create mental images — e.g., to day-dream about being at the beach or, with our eyes closed, to picture our living rooms — as a nonphysical model for understanding God's creation of the world *ex nihilo*. In any case, it is true that (i) models themselves are understandable only by reference to data whose intelligibility is borrowed by, and not dependent on, the model, and (ii) there are cases of physical-mental and mental-physical causality that are intelligible without models and whose intelligibility can be borrowed by models. Hence (a) the intelligibility of causal claims cannot universally rest on our having models for them, and (b) it is arbitrary (as well as false) to think that all causal models must be physical-physical.

8. Strictly, it rejects brute existential facts — those properly recorded via assertions with such forms are *There is an X* or *There are X and Y*.

9. Or else real definitions; cf. note 4 above.

10. Appeal is often made here to the *necessary identity* doctrine that *If A is identical to B then A is necessarily identical to B*. If this doctrine is true, then it follows straight off that if it is possible that I exist and have no body, then I cannot be identical to any body. We shall then need a circumspect way of putting the necessary identity doctrine — perhaps in one version about properties and in another about substances. One will be a doctrine about possible relations among properties and the other a doctrine about possible relations among things — neither can be a doctrine about relations among terms and terms or among terms and things. The property doctrine perhaps will be something like the conjunct of these claims: PD1. If property *Q1* can be instantiated in *X* without property *Q2* being instantiated in *X*, then *Q1* is a different property than *Q2*; PD2. If property *Q1* is identical to property *Q2* then necessarily property *Q1* is identical to property *Q2*; PD3. If necessarily property *Q1* is identical to property *Q2*, then there is no possible world in which one of them is instantiated and the other is not. The substance doctrine perhaps will be something like the conjunct of these claims: SD1. If substance *M* can exist without substance *S* existing, then

M is a different substance than S ; SD2. If substance M is identical to substance S then necessarily substance M is identical to substance S ; SD3. If necessarily substance M is identical to substance S then there is no possible world graced with M and not with S or graced with S but not with M .

11. The temptation here is to argue: D3a. Any property that does not have *being a physical property* as its essence is not a physical property; So: D3b. *Being self-conscious* is not a physical property. But D3a. presupposes that *being self-conscious*, lacking *being a physical property* as its essence, cannot be physically instantiated. Functionalism's varieties deny that presupposition. Functionalism requires that the essence of the mental is to be *role defined* and that anything, physical or not, that plays the right sort of (causal) role is mental in nature. It seems to me that *being self-conscious* is to be phenomenologically understood; its nature is intrinsic, not role-defined. Functionalism, in effect, makes *being self-conscious* a topic neutral property, which seems to me necessarily false of *being self-conscious*. But I will not insist on D3a. here, and will return below to the issue that it raises.

12. Reference to *my self-consciousness* is not problematic here; plainly "*my self-consciousness*" has a different referent than "*self-consciousness in general*" (which has no referent unless it is understood as "*individual self-consciousnesses, collectively considered*") or "*someone else's self-consciousness,*" and its referent is the one required to make the premise true. The premise should be understood Cartesianly: what I am identical to at time T is a particular mental substance — a particular thing that has *being self-conscious* as its essence. While the premise stated is true, parallel claims in which "*my self-consciousness*" is replaced by, say, "*my right hand,*" "*my minivan.*" or "*my body*" are not true.

13. This is very different from having been refuted or even having been subjected to impressive critique. I have not tried here to discuss "the nature of the mental" — to deal with propositional attitudes and intentionality, let alone such (I believe) less central issues as privacy and alleged incorrigibility. There are myriad physicalistic and topic-neutral analyses of these notions. There is also the move of giving up on any such analysis and simply fiatting that these notions have no purchase on reality. Useful perspective on these matters is given in Chapter Twelve of *The Philosophical Papers of Alan Donagan* (ed. J.E. Malpas; Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1994) and *Donagan's Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987). There is also the suggestion that since the evolutionary process has not prepared us for dealing with hard metaphysical problems, we cannot expect to have any successful physicalistic or topic-neutral accounts but this fact should not make us suspicious of physicalism (a move analogous to Freudians inviting their critics to the psychoanalytic couch). Apparently, appeals to mystery are not limited to religion.

14. Cf. the remarks in footnote 10.

15. Notoriously, there are problems about what distinguishes one MPB at time T from another MPB at T .

16. There are various difficulties with of an MPB view of personal identity. Note its apparent entailments regarding memory and morality. On an MPB view of things, a person is a collection of MPBs at one moment and another collection at another, membership in a series being constitutive of being a person over time. Series membership, in turn, is causally constituted; a series is formed

when one collection gives causal rise to another, and that to another. Consider what memory presumably amounts to on this view. At one moment, in collection *C1*, a state obtains. At a later moment, in collection *C17*, another state obtains that represents the first state's having obtained and is caused by the state that it represents (indirectly, of course; the *C1* state is long gone by the time *C17* puts in an appearance). A state just like *C17* but not caused by *C1*, or a state just like *C17* and caused by *C1* but occurring in a different series than the one that *C1* occurred in — perhaps a state caused by hearing the *C1*-series person describe *C1* by an especially apt representor — will not be a memory state relative to *C1*. (This entails that “same series” cannot be defined in terms of memory states, since nothing is a memory state that is not in the same series as the state that caused it and that it represents.) Consider also the account of moral responsibility that the MPB account offers. Actions are performed at times. Without worrying here about how temporally minimal a collection must be — about, so to speak, how long a single moment is— suppose that a bundle or collection *Cx* performs a wrong action that is punished. It will be a different collection — say, *Cy* — that is punished for doing what *Cx* did. If *Cx* performs an action, then *Cx* is a person, and (on the relevant doctrines) *Cy* as recipient of punishment is also a person. Collections are persons in one sense of “person” — *person(1)*, let us say. But if *Cy* is properly the recipient of punishment for *Cx*'s deed, then *Cy* must be a later collection in the same series as that to which *Cx* belongs. A series of collections is a person in a second sense — say, *person(2)*. A *person(1)* is a momentary being — a tiny substance that is not robust. A *person(2)* is not a momentary being and is not a robust substance; it is a series of momentary beings, a sequence of tiny substances, each tiny substance being numerically distinct from each other. Memory, then, on a MPB account is a matter of a state in a later *person(1)* being caused by an earlier *person(1)* who no longer exists. Responsibility, reward, and punishment are matters of a later *person(1)* being responsible, rewarded, or punished for what an earlier *person(1)* did. What justifies calling this memory or responsibility (if anything does) is simply that the later *person(1)* is in the same causal series as the earlier *person(1)*; numerical identity among earlier and later *persons(1)* is impossible. A *person(2)* “acts” only in the sense that its constitutive *persons(1)* act. A *person(2)* is nothing more nor less than one *person(1)* after another, each caused by its predecessor. At any given time, there are no *persons(2)* save insofar as there are *persons(1)* who had causal ancestors. To say that there are *persons(2)* is only to say that *persons(1)* causally succeed one another. Hence it is logically impossible that a *person(2)* at time *T* be identical, in whole or part, with a *person(2)* at time *T-1* or with a *person(2)* at *T+1*; all that exists of a *person(2)* at time *T* is a *person(1)* at *T*, and the *person(1)* at *T* exists at no time other than *T* and hence cannot be numerically identical to anything earlier or later than *T*. Talk of the numerical identity of *persons(2)* over time is entirely chimerical. Memories occur only in worlds in which earlier beings are numerically identical to later ones. Responsibility obtains only in worlds in which earlier beings are numerically identical to later beings. If we are nothing but MPBs, we have no memories and we are responsible for nothing. Since it is far clearer that we have memories and are responsible for our actions than that there is any reason whatever to think that we are nothing but MPBs, we are not merely MPBs. Had Hume's argument against robust substances succeeded, perhaps we would have to accept that there are no memories or respon-

sibilities; but it did not succeed.

17. Even if we cannot find out the truth about Mary, it will not follow that there is no truth about her to be found. It is appropriate to wonder exactly what the transmission device did. Did it destroy Mary and make two Xerox copies? Did it clone Mary and send her to Venus and her clone to Cleveland? That we cannot tell which it did does not entail that it did not do one thing rather than another.

18. I will ignore here what seems to me another necessary truth: no person can cease to exist and then exist again — i.e. it is logically impossible that there be retention of personal identity over time gaps. This assumes (what also seems to me true) that (a) persons are substances and are not essentially composite substances, and (b) no substance that is not essentially composite can exist over time gaps. The idea that substance dualism is “anti-biblical” is the product more of eisegesis than exegesis; cf. John Cooper, *Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1989).