

Todd Moody

Consciousness and the Mind–Body Problem

The State of the Argument

In the years since ‘Conversations With Zombies’ was published in JCS (Moody, 1994), I’ve continued to think and write about the problem of consciousness, and its implications for the more general mind–body problem. In the process, I’ve become increasingly aware of the metaphilosophical questions that are connected to the mind–body problem. Philosophy is unique in the extent to which its ‘object level’ problems are entangled with its ‘meta’ problems. In philosophy, we often hear that the ‘solution’ to a problem is to recognize that the problem itself is somehow spurious, or misconceived, or in some way defective. Thus, the only way to solve it is to walk away from it. This somewhat deflationary approach is resisted by those who see the problem as disclosing something deep and important about reality, something we should pay attention to. The tension between these two metaphilosophical stances seldom eases.

I believe the mind–body problem in general, and the problem of consciousness in particular, are real problems with pervasive implications, rather than defective pseudo-problems that we can just walk away from. In this essay, I propose to sketch the nature of the problems, as I see them, and explain the apparent impasse that exists between various proposed solutions. I shall then offer a brief argument that the impasse itself points to one of those solutions.

A few years ago, Jaegwon Kim wrote: ‘The shared project of the majority of those who have worked on the mind–body problem over

Correspondence:

Todd Moody, Professor of Philosophy, Saint Joseph’s University, Philadelphia, PA 19131, USA. Email: tmoody@sju.edu

the past few decades has been to find a way of accommodating the mental within a principled physicalist scheme, while at the same time preserving it as something distinctive — that is, without losing what we value, or find special, in our nature as creatures with minds' (Kim, 2000, p. 2). In recent decades, the mind–body problem has itself split into subsidiary problems, such as the 'hard problem' of consciousness, the problem of mental causation, and the problem of Intentionality. This is because the domain of what Kim calls 'the mental' has itself fissioned into subdomains. Nonetheless, the *experiential* aspect of the mental remains a core problem, and the 'problem of consciousness' is simply another way of referring to the problem of explaining the experiential aspect of the mental.

Kim's statement of the mind–body problem presents the 'physicalist scheme' as something settled, within which our conception of the mental must somehow be made to fit, rather like trying to close an overpacked suitcase. In this construal of the problem, physicalism is presented as something we know about reality. Otherwise, why should we be bothered about trying to accommodate the mental within it? Why not just leave it out? It's because physicalism is meant to be an exhaustive ontology, applying to all of reality. As Kim sets the problem up, physicalism is very close to a *given*, which implies that if something has to be given up or modified, it will be on the mental side of the conflict. Let's look at another statement of the problem, this time from Thomas Nagel, in his controversial new book, *Mind and Cosmos*:

[T]here are doubts about whether the reality of such features of our world as consciousness, intentionality, meaning, purpose, thought, and value can be accommodated in a universe consisting at the most basic level only of physical facts — facts, however sophisticated, of the kind revealed by the physical sciences. (Nagel, 2012, p. 13)

Nagel echoes Kim in seeing the mind–body problem(s) as a problem of accommodating the facts about the mental (and not just the mental) into a physical world. But he doesn't take physicalism as a given, expressing real doubt as to whether the accommodation is possible. Between these two ways of thinking about the mind–body problem, I favour Nagel's.

In stark contrast to these construals of the mind–body problem is the following assertion by Galen Strawson:

[W]e have no good reason to think that we know anything about the physical that gives us any reason to find any problem in the idea that

experiential phenomena are physical phenomena. (Strawson, 2006, p. 4)

That is, according to Strawson, Kim's and Nagel's statements of the problem are incorrect because they presuppose that we know something about the physical that makes trouble for the mental. Strawson's solution is to deny this. Let us therefore focus on the nature of the alleged conflict between the mental and the physical, with specific attention to consciousness.

Strawson, like many contemporary philosophers working in this area, sees the experiential aspect of the mental (consciousness) as the aspect that attracts philosophical attention, due to the so-called 'explanatory gap'. This term, first proposed by Joseph Levine (1983), refers to the absence of any conceptual connection between certain concepts that we take to be mental and those that we understand to be physical. Although the path is well worn, I should say a bit more about this. The explanatory gap is also sometimes called the 'irreducibility of the mental', but there are persistent disputes about the nature of reduction, whether explanations must be reductive, and so forth. For present purposes, there is no need to enter into those disputes. To use a familiar example, we can *explain* the liquidity of water in two steps. First, we analyse the concept of liquidity itself, noting that liquids have constant volume, assume the shape of their containers, can be poured, and so on. Second, we describe how the microstructure of water at room temperature entails that it will have precisely those properties that we collect under the term 'liquid'. That is, we describe how the kinetic energy in the water molecules is sufficient to prevent them from settling into a lattice formation, so they continue to tumble past each other, but insufficient to drive them off into the air in large numbers. There are conceptual 'hooks' that make the explanation work. The shape-changing and pouring aspects of water are ways that water moves, and these are explained by the ways molecules move. The liquidity of water is sometimes called an 'emergent' property, and that term is as good as any other. It's a property that emerges when there are enough water molecules present under the right conditions. But the point about the explanatory gap is that the rule in nature is that where there is emergence, there is explicability. We can explain the emergent liquidity of water by showing that, given the properties of water molecules, emergent liquidity is just what we should expect. Emergence without explicability would be what Strawson calls 'brute emergence', which he rejects as incoherent — correctly, in my view. It's no explanation to say that at some level of aggregation of entities,

a new property simply appears, with nothing about the entities or their aggregation to suggest that it should. Strawson's position is that consciousness is not, and cannot be, emergent, due to the explanatory gap. That in turn entails that consciousness is a fundamental property of physical things, since if a property isn't emergent there's nothing left for it to be but fundamental. More on that later.

Levine himself writes, 'The explanatory gap argument doesn't demonstrate a gap in nature, but a gap in our understanding of nature'.¹ That is, we shouldn't let the explanatory gap beguile us into doubting physicalism. Colin McGinn has made a similar point, arguing that we are 'cognitively closed' to the correct explanation of how consciousness arises in the physical world (McGinn, 1994). We are simply not so constituted as to be able to grasp it. Like Levine, McGinn doesn't think this should lead us to doubt physicalism. According to these philosophers, and many others, the most we can learn from the explanatory gap is that our conceptual apparatus isn't up to the challenge of explaining consciousness. The explanation is there, but beyond us, permanently or temporarily, depending on who you listen to. I'll have more to say about the cognitive closure thesis later in this essay. According to McGinn and Levine, and many others, the mind-body problem gives us no reason to revise what we think about what kind of world there is; it just shows our limits as thinkers. This is consistent with a general philosophical retreat from 'substantive' metaphysics in the modern period. Philosophy, on this view, can never lead us to discoveries about the real world; at most it can disclose problems in the way we think about it. So we should just note this fact and demur from making any metaphysical inferences from it.

Galen Strawson also thinks we shouldn't abandon physicalism in the face of the problem of consciousness. Unlike McGinn and Levine, however, he thinks the problem of consciousness can be deflated by taking a fresh look at the *physical*. That is, he sees the mind-body problem as indeed a conflict between what we think we know about consciousness and what we think we know about the physical, but the adjustment needed to resolve the conflict should be at least in part on the physical side. We don't know all that we think we know about physical things and, once we recognize that, the problem changes. Specifically, there's nothing in what we do know about the physical that makes trouble for consciousness, because there's nothing in the concept of the physical that excludes consciousness. If consciousness

[1] <http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Levine.html>

isn't excluded by our notion of the physical, the problem is how to *augment* that notion to accommodate consciousness.

Strawson develops a position he calls 'real materialism' or 'realistic monism', according to which consciousness, or the experiential aspect of the mental, is inherent in the physical. That is, if consciousness is not emergent, as the explanatory gap tells us it cannot be, then either it isn't real at all or it's rooted in fundamental 'micro-experiential' properties of matter, whatever they might be. If we reject the possibility that consciousness isn't even real, we can take refuge in panpsychism. Panpsychism gets little love in contemporary philosophy. Indeed, it is generally dismissed as absurd. Strawson obviously disagrees, but I'll postpone further discussion of the issue until a bit later.

Turning back to Kim's 'principled physicalist scheme' within which the accommodation of the mental is a problem, its defining principle is causal closure. Kim stipulates the following definition: 'If a physical event has a cause (occurring) at time *t*, it has a sufficient physical cause at *t*' (Kim, 2006). In his view, the causal closure thesis is one of the main commitments of what he calls 'minimal physicalism'. It allows for uncaused physical events but rules out physical events with non-physical causes.

If this is what a principled physicalist scheme consists in, then it presupposes that we have some reasonably clear conception of what 'physical events' and 'physical causes' are. But do we? Hempel pointed out that the tendency of philosophers since the beginning of the twentieth century has been to take physical properties to be whatever physicists say they are. 'Hempel's Dilemma' is the resulting fact that if we use current physics as our reference point, then our conception of the physical is almost certainly false in part, and incomplete. If we use future physics — 'completed' physics — as our reference point, then we really have no idea what physical properties and events are (Hempel, 1969). Of course, Hempel was not the only one to make this easily overlooked point (see Chomsky, 1995, for example). Some philosophers have drawn the inevitable conclusion: without a clear conception of what physical properties, states, events, and causes actually *are*, the problem of 'accommodating' the mental has less philosophical bite than we have traditionally thought. Chris Daly writes, 'If there is no satisfactory philosophical account of what physical properties are, then certain philosophical programmes and debates are not well-defined and lose much of their interest' (Daly, 1998). The question is, do we have enough of an understanding of

physical properties, even without a final or ultimate physical theory, to generate the problem of consciousness? I believe we do.

David Chalmers has argued that physics, now and in the future, deals with the 'structure and function' of things, so that physical properties are ultimately structural-functional properties (Chalmers, 1996, p. 153). It's worth taking a moment to ask what this might mean. Structure is about how the parts of a thing are related to each other. Function is how they interact, among themselves and with other things. If there are any simple physical things, they would lack structure by lacking parts, but they would still have function, since what Chalmers is calling 'function' appears to be nothing other than the causal powers of things, and their interactions. But is having causal powers sufficient for something to count as physical?

If there are non-physical things, they would presumably have causal powers. Arguably, having causal powers is a necessary condition for speaking of something as *real*. Kim makes precisely this point in his discussions of the reality of the mental. It's why he sees mental causation as another central issue of the mind-body problem. There may be no non-physical things, but if so, their nonexistence shouldn't be a matter of definition. That, however, would be a consequence of insisting that causal powers are *sufficient* for something's being physical. So function itself isn't the 'mark of the physical'; and structure only applies to compound physical things, so that can't be it either.

Descartes famously claimed that the essence of the physical is spatial extension. This is thought to have been discredited by post-Newtonian physics, in which there are fields and very tiny entities without clear boundaries. Even so, the notion of extension doesn't require us to think of all physical things as clearly demarcated entities like balls or Platonic solids. Current physical theory has 'four forces' that supposedly subsume all causal interactions. These forces are construed as fields, and although fields in theoretical physics may have many more dimensions than three or four, fields are still spatio-temporal things. They have a *geometry*, even if that geometry seems unfamiliar to us. When we say that future physics may be very different from current physics, do we mean that it may do away with the concepts of forces and fields and their associated geometries altogether, or only that its forces, fields, and geometries may be very different from what it recognizes today? To be sure, anything is possible, but from our current vantage point any future science that we can recognize as 'physics' will deal with some sort of forces and fields and associated geometries. If we substitute 'geometry' for Descartes' 'extension' we have a more future-proof mark of the physical.

Barbara Montero notes that if physicalism is true, then there is some level of description at and below which there is no explanatory gap. Even if there is no ‘bottom’ or ultimate level of description, as some philosophers and physicists suspect,² physicalism can be seen as committed to the view that there is a lowest ‘gappy’ level that isn’t the lowest level of all (see, for example, Montero, 2006). According to physicalism, the explanatory gap doesn’t go all the way down.

Daniel Dennett writes, ‘each of us knows exactly one mind from the inside, and no two of us know the same mind from the inside. No other kind of thing is known about in that way’ (Dennett, 1996, p. 3). This is the heart of what makes experiential properties experiential. That is, there is *something* that each of us knows ‘from the inside’, acknowledging that this spatial preposition is a metaphor for a unique pairing relation that is not spatial — not *geometric* — and no two of us know that same something in that unique way. Dennett’s second sentence introduces the gap. There’s nothing else we know about the world that explains why there should or could be this unique kind of knowledge, which is commonly called the ‘first-person point of view’, which is the only non-inferential view of consciousness we have. To know ‘one mind from the inside’ is to be a *subject*.

Do we then know enough about the physical and the mental to say, as Strawson denies, that there is a genuine problem reconciling the two? I think we do. Although the Cartesian idea of matter as ‘extended substance’ is naïve, the neo-Cartesian idea of physical properties involving the geometries of forces and fields is not naïve at all. Where Dennett says of the experiential that ‘no other kind of thing is known about in that way’, we may substitute this claim: every other kind of thing is known about in a way that involves the geometry of forces and fields. That being so, it’s reasonable to say that even if there is no ‘bottom level’ of microphysical description — even if the quest of physics for such a level cannot even in principle be completed — we can still expect that it will be forces, fields, and geometry ‘all the way down’ if it is to count as physics at all. This entails that the explanatory gap also persists all the way down. The prospect of finding ‘microexperiential’ properties of microphysical entities, so that the conceptual gap between the mental and the physical fades to nothing, is not one that we can seriously entertain. Even the microexperiential must be, in some sense, experiential; otherwise it’s a term without content. The future is unknown, but that fact shouldn’t incline us to say *now* that it is a large and fatal mistake to suppose that we know enough about the

[2] This certainly looks like a substantive metaphysical claim, incidentally.

physical to have a real mind–body problem. On the contrary, everything we know and understand about the physical at present suggests that not only is Kim right to frame the problem as he does, but also Chalmers, McGinn, and other Mysterians are right to point out that there are no present prospects for accomplishing the ‘accommodating’ that Kim calls for.

Kim himself concludes that ‘Physicalism is not the whole truth, but it is the truth near enough’ (Kim, 2005, p. 6). But what does that mean? It seems to mean that the problem of consciousness (and mental causation) is real, and physicalism is false, because for physicalism to be true at all, *it must be the whole truth*. That’s the only kind of truth it can be. What does it mean, then, to say that physicalism is false but ‘near enough’ to the truth? I’m not sure, but I think it means that it’s false in a way we can safely ignore. Maybe it means that physicalism is the best false theory we have.

In contrast, Thomas Nagel, who Kim quotes in support of the reality of the problem of consciousness, sees the deeply unsatisfying character of Kim’s conclusion and reluctantly concedes that physicalism will either need to be rejected or modified in ways that will make it barely recognizable. He is also sceptical of Strawson’s panpsychism solution, writing:

The protopsychic properties of all matter, on such a view, are postulated solely because they are needed to explain the appearance of consciousness at high levels of organic complexity. Apart from that nothing is known about them: they are completely indescribable and have no predictable local effects, in contrast to the physical properties of electrons and protons, which allow them to be detected individually. (Nagel, 2012, pp. 61–2)

That is, the prospects for making sense of microexperiential/protopsychic properties are poor. Nagel thinks we may have to return to a teleological conception of nature, of the sort that scientific physicalism is widely supposed to have banished for good. I can’t explore that option in depth here. I mention it only to underscore the force of the problem.

I have focused on Kim, Strawson, and Nagel in this essay because of my admiration for their work. Each has shown the philosophical courage to confront the problem of consciousness and follow the arguments. None of them have attempted to deflate or sidestep the problem, as some others have done.

I’ve said nothing at all about dualism as a possible solution. None of the philosophers I’ve mentioned see it as a live option. Kim has considered it in detail and rejected it. Some philosophers are taking a

fresh look at it (see, for example, Baker and Goetz, 2010), but I think it's fair to say, however, that dualism finds nearly as little support as panpsychism in contemporary philosophy.

The two main flavours of dualism are property dualism and substance dualism. Property dualism is an attempt to retain a physicalist ontology, but allowing for two irreducibly distinct kinds of properties. The general idea is this: the explanatory gap is real; we can't account for consciousness (and perhaps also mental causation and Intentionality) in terms of the physical properties of things. Still, we are convinced that physical things are the only things there are, so there must be some physical things that have these quirky non-physical properties. Once again, however, we run up against the question of what a physical thing actually is. A simple answer might look like this: a physical thing is something that has *only* physical properties, where physical properties are explained along the lines sketched earlier in this essay. That is, physical properties involve forces and fields and their associated geometries. But that won't do, since some apparently physical things, such as ourselves, also have the property of consciousness. So if we actually are physical things, we have these other properties in addition to our physical properties. Then we must deal with the question of why some physical things, but not others, have these other properties. Property dualism isn't really an answer to the mind–body problem. It just *is* the mind–body problem.

Substance dualism is the view that, given the issues already developed, there must be *something else* 'present' that accounts for consciousness and the other troublesome properties. That something else must have fundamental properties quite different from the properties of purely physical things, given the failure of physical properties to explain the troublesome ones.

Before moving ahead with this sketch of dualism, I'd like to point out that nothing said so far entails that the something else must be individual souls paired with individual brains. That's one form substance dualism could take, but mere 'minimal substance dualism' leaves that open. It's equally possible that there is some single non-spatial 'field' that accounts for consciousness. Minimal substance dualism requires only the claim that consciousness, etc. depends for its existence upon something more than appropriately organized matter.

The critic will immediately insist that substance dualism is a merely ad hoc theory that 'answers' a philosophical question by positing an equivalently obscure entity of some sort. Even though it seems impossible to discern how organized matter can give rise to conscious

mental states, it surely doesn't advance our understanding to think that some other kind of substance, of which we have no independent evidence, can do it. Occam tells us not to multiply entities without necessity, so we just shouldn't go there.

In reply, the substance dualist can argue that the impossibility of explaining consciousness in physical terms just *is* 'necessity', and can paraphrase Sherlock Holmes in *The Sign of Four*, 'Once you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however ad hoc, must be the truth'. The critic will insist that the undeniable difficulties of making physicalism work don't rise (or sink) to the level of impossible, so we should heed Occam rather than Sherlock. The dualist will complain that the physicalist is setting the bar too high. The utter disconnect between anything recognizable as a physical property and the distinctive features of consciousness is as close as we ever get to impossible.

Another argument against dualism has to do with the strong correlation between mental states and physical states, and especially the changes in mental states that are correlated with changes in the brain. Consciousness itself goes away in the presence of the right chemicals, as the anaesthesiologist knows. Isn't this powerful evidence that all mental states are just emergent from brain activity after all?

It would be, except this correlation is also consistent with substance dualism. If consciousness does not originate in the brain but is in some way mediated by it, correlation is what we would expect. Again, the critic will appeal to Occam and the dualist will revert to the reply in the previous paragraph. Moreover, a bold dualist may point out that the correlation isn't quite as tight as the critic thinks. There are, for example, cases of near-death experiences involving lucid conscious ideation and even perception in the apparent absence of the relevant sort of brain activity (see, for example, van Lommel, 2011). All such cases are controversial precisely because of their ontological implications. There are disputes about whether the experiences actually happened during 'flatline' EEG periods, or whether EEG is sensitive enough to detect all possibly relevant brain activity. The available empirical evidence just doesn't seem to move the conversation forward. The physicalist will argue that since we already have very good reason to believe all mental states are somehow generated by brain processes, we have equivalently good reason to think that in the NDE cases we've simply missed the subtle brain activity that explains them. The dualist of course argues that we know enough about the normal correlations between cortical activity and conscious ideation

to be able to say with a high degree of confidence that in at least some NDE cases there should have been no conscious episodes at all.

The impasse remains. To the physicalist, the very anomalousness of such cases is simply evidence that there's more to the brain's ability to generate consciousness than we yet fully understand; to the dualist, it's evidence that consciousness is at least sometimes independent of brain function. Moreover, the dualist will find added explanatory power in not having to dismiss these phenomena as anomalies or faulty observations.

Purely philosophical objections to substance dualism have traditionally focused on the so-called problem of interaction: how is it even conceptually possible for an immaterial entity to interact causally with a physical entity? This argument is brought into sharp focus as the 'causal pairing problem' by Jaegwon Kim (2001). The causal pairing problem is simple enough to state: causal interactions are interactions between things, and we are only able to pair causes with effects in a spatial manner. We can say that the rock caused the window to break because of the contact between the two, and that contact involves essentially spatial relations. If the soul or immaterial mind is actually immaterial, it doesn't have any spatial properties at all. It doesn't have a location, and we therefore have no way to associate it with any alleged effects in the realm of physical things.

Granted, this is a problem of mental causation, not consciousness. The dualist might retreat to the view that even if mental causation is problematic, consciousness itself can inhere in a non-physical substance as a purely passive 'witness' to the goings-on in the physical world. But the physicalist can press the point and argue that even the physical-to-mental causation implied by this sort of epiphenomenalism is problematic because of the causal pairing problem. Moreover, if there is no mental-to-physical causation, consciousness itself shouldn't be able to impinge upon our cognitive apparatus in such a way that we can know about it. And if knowledge itself is somehow utterly immaterial then it is causally impotent to drive our behaviours when we talk about it. Stating 'I am conscious' would necessarily be causally disconnected from being conscious, if consciousness lacks causal powers. The dualist can only reply that spatial pairing is only relevant to physical causation, and it's unrealistic to expect mind–body interaction to follow the same pattern. Minds and bodies must be causally paired in some non-spatial way. Basic causal powers are inexplicable brute facts. If there are non-physical entities in which consciousness inheres they may indeed have basic causal powers that simply don't resemble the basic causal powers of physical things. This

is reasonable but unlikely to bring a smile to anyone's face. Substance dualism isn't really an explanation of consciousness, mental causation, or Intentionality. It's a theory about why we don't have explanations of these things.

I want to complete the circle by reconsidering the view that, even though the explanatory gap is intractable and consciousness remains opaque to our understanding, we should still be physicalists. Near the beginning of this survey I mentioned Colin McGinn's cognitive closure thesis, according to which there is a purely naturalistic or physicalist explanation of how we manage to be conscious (and other intractable philosophical questions) but our kind of mind is cognitively closed to it. Our minds — that is, the thought processes sustainable by our brains — simply don't have the resources to handle the problem. We don't know how brains produce consciousness, but we know enough to know that they do produce it. Our inability to know how they do it is simply a limitation of our brains, with no further metaphysical implications.

This position is, of course, as ad hoc as any version of dualism. It relocates the mystery of consciousness, embedding it in a kind of restricted scepticism. It's ad hoc because it introduces a limitation on understanding that we have no independent reason to suspect. In addition, a troubling thing about restricted scepticism is that it's hard to keep it restricted. If we are constitutionally incapable of understanding how brains produce consciousness because 'The hardness of philosophy is thus an upshot of the particular way that natural selection has built our thinking organ, not an objective trait of the subject-matter of philosophical questions' (McGinn, 1993, p. 31), then we have equally little reason to be confident that we know *that* physicalism is true, since that conviction rests on the very same kind of philosophical reasoning. Indeed, this position leads straight into the problem raised by Alvin Plantinga in his much discussed evolutionary argument against naturalism.³ This isn't the place to pursue that trail, however.

The evolutionary history of our brains isn't the only possible explanation of why we might be cognitively closed to the solution to the hard problem of consciousness. Substance dualism itself hints at another explanation. There is something it is like to be conscious, and there is something it is like to understand. Few people question the first point, but the second needs further comment. Understanding, as a mental state, has both a functional and an experiential aspect.

[3] See, for example, http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/virtual_library/articles/plantinga_alvin/naturalism_defeated.pdf.

Functionally, to understand X is simply to be able to carry on doing X-related things. In this purely functional sense, to understand Chinese is to be able to pass the Turing test in Chinese. But there is another aspect to understanding, a first-person experiential aspect. To borrow Dennett's turn of phrase, we also know what understanding is 'from the inside'. If this weren't so, Searle's famous Chinese Room argument, according to which we simply *know that we don't understand* Chinese despite getting all the marks on the papers right, wouldn't even get started. It is precisely because *understanding has a phenomenology* — a first-person experiential aspect — that the Chinese Room has any traction, even as an 'intuition pump'. But if dualism is true, we'd *expect* it to be the case that there's nothing it is like to be a brain, a programmed computer, a big computer made of little computers (i.e. a 'connection machine'), or any other purely physical thing. If dualism is true, we are with respect to our consciousness and understanding utterly different from physical things, so the opacity of our connection to them is just what we'd expect. This is why I stated above that although dualism isn't really an explanation of consciousness, it is a theory of why we don't have such an explanation. It's an alternative to the view that cognitive closure is a basic fact about human brains. The evolutionary origin of brains doesn't really predict specific cognitive closure about the nature of consciousness. If anything, it predicts cognitive closure in any abstract and theoretical domain. But cognitive closure is an expected consequence of an ontological gap between the mental (or some of it) and the physical. It's not a direct argument for dualism, but it is a transcendental one, and if dualism is actually true, that's as good as it's going to get.

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